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NOTES

THE IRAN & LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF
1996: A THORN IN THE SIDE OF THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
I.

INTRODUCTION

On August 5, 1996, President Clinton signed the Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) into law.' ILSA was a direct reaction to the increasing emergence of the United States
as a prime target for acts of international terrorism2 and thus
the statute's primary justification is rooted in national security
interests.3 Iran and Libya became the focal points of ILSA due
to Congressional findings that both of these "rogue" nations4
were avid supporters of international terrorism.5
ILSA requires the president to impose at least two out of a
list of six sanctions on any "person" who enters into certain
types of transactions with Iran or Libya.? With respect to both
1. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541
(1996).
2. During the congressional debates over the bill that eventually became the
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), Representative Benjamin Gilman from New
York reflected this concern by stating that "fi]n light of the growing . . . likelihood
that state-sponsored terrorism poses an increasing threat to Americans inside and
outside of the United States, we should place the strongest possible deterrent to
any future acts of terrorism supported by such rogue regimes as Iran and Libya."
142 CONG. REC. H8126 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Rep. Gilman).
3. The congressional findings enumerated in Section 2 of ILSA specifically
state that Iran and Libya's support of acts of international terrorism poses a
threat to the national security interests of the United States. See Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act § 2(1)-(4).
4. Iran and Libya were categorized as rogue regimes throughout the Congressional debates over ELSA. See, e.g. 142 CONG. REC. H8126 (daily ed. July 23,
1996) ("there is no doubt that Iran and Libya are rogue states.") (statement of
Rep. Roth); 142 CONG. REC. H8126 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) ("rogue regimes such
as Iran and Libya.") (statement of Rep. Gilman).
5. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 2(1)-(4).
6. See id. § 5(a)-(b). The president has delegated most of his responsibilities
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Iran and Libya, sanctions must be imposed on any "person"
who makes an "investment"7 of $40 million' or more that "directly and significantly contribute[s] to the enhancement" of
the ability of those countries to develop their "petroleum resources. With respect to Libya only, 0 sanctions must also
be imposed on "persons" who engage in other forms of transactions including the transfer of goods, services, or technology
that contribute to: (1) Libya's ability to acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons; (2) the development of Libya's petroleum resources; or (3) the ability of Libya to maintain its
aviation capabilities." The list of sanctions that may be imposed under ILSA includes: (1) the prohibition of the ExportImport Bank of the United States from approving the issuance

under ILSA to the Office of Economic Sanctions Policy at the Secretary of State.
See Memorandum, Delegation of Responsibilities Under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 64,249 (1996). For purposes of this Note, however,
USA's provisions are discussed as if they are performed solely by the president.
7. For purposes of ILSA, the term "investment" has been defined as any of
the following activities, if undertaken pursuant to an agreement with Iran or Libya: (1) the entry into a contract involving the development of petroleum resources
in Iran or Libya; (2) the purchase of an ownership interest in such a development;
(3) the entry into a contract providing for the participation in royalties, earnings,
profits in such a development. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 14(9)(A)-(C).
Much to the relief of the U.S. banking industry, financing contracts for the sale or
purchase of goods, services, or technology have been excluded from the definition
of "investment." See id. § 14(9); see also Clyde Mitchell, The New Sanctions Act,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 21, 1996, at 3. Due to confusion over ILSA's definition of "investment," the term was defined in greater detail by the State Department on December 16, 1996. See Additional Information for the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 61
Fed. Reg. 66,067 (1996).
8. Or any combination of investments of at least $10 million each that exceed $40 million in a 12 month period. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 5(a)(b)(2).
9. See id. ILSA's definition of "petroleum resources" includes both petroleum
and natural gas resources. See id. § 14(15).
10. Iran and Libya are treated differently by ILSA due to "their different
economic histories and distinct geopolitical circumstances." HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996, H.R. REP. No. 104-523, pt.
II, at 14 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. 1311, 1317 [hereinafter WAYS &
MEANS REPORT].

11. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 5(b)(1)(A)-(C). In addition to goods,
services, and technology, this section applies to the transfer of other items that
are prohibited by paragraphs 4(b) or 5 of U.N. Security Resolution 748 and paragraphs 5 or 6 of U.N. Security Resolution 883. The prohibited items in these resolutions primarily involve aircraft equipment, military supplies, and oil refining
equipment. See G.A. Res. 883, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3312th mtg. paras. 5-6,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/883 (1993); G.A. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063rd mtg.
paras. 4(b),5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992).
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of any guarantee, insurance or extension of credit to sanctioned
parties;' (2) U.S. refusal to grant licenses for the export of
certain goods to sanctioned parties;" (3) the prohibition of
U.S. financial institutions from issuing loans over $10,000,000
in a 12-month period to sanctioned parties;'4 (4) the prohibition of sanctioned financial institutions from being primary
dealers in U.S. government debt instruments; 5 serving as
agents of the U.S. government or serving as repositories for
U.S. government funds; 6 (5) the prohibition of the U.S. government from entering into procurement contracts with sanctioned parties;' and (6) the restriction of imports from sanctioned parties. 8 ILSA's definition of sanctionable "persons"
includes foreign individuals, foreign corporations and, under
the proper circumstances, even foreign nations. 9
ILSA has been the center of considerable political saber
rattling since its inception. 0 The controversy surrounding the
statute does not stem from the fact that it targets the economies of Iran and Libya. To the contrary, the United States has
selectively refused to trade with nations that it has classified
as supporters of terrorism since the 1980s. 2 ' ILSA, which con-

12. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 6(1).
13. See id. § 6(2)(i)-(iv).
14. See id. § 6(3).
15. See id. § 6(4)(A).
16. See id. § 6(4)(B).
17. See id. § 6(5).
18. See id. § 6(6).
19. Specifically, ILSA's definition of a "person" that may be sanctioned includes natural persons, corporations, business associations, societies, trusts, any
non-governmental entities or organizations, and any governmental organizations
operating as a business enterprise. See id. § 14(14)(A)-(C).
20. Members of the European Union (EU), such as Italy, Germany, and
France, immediately condemned ILSA when the statute was ratified by Congress.
See Youssef M. Ibrahim, EU Opens Fire on New Sanctions, INTL HERALD TRIB.,
July 25, 1996, at 6. The United States, in turn, condemned ILSA's critics for dealing with the terrorist regimes of Iran and Libya. See Alison Mitchell, Clinton
Signs Bill Against Investing in Iran and Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1996, at Al.
When President Clinton signed ILSA, he gave the following message to those opposing the statute: 'you simply can't do business with people by day who are
killing your people by night." Remarks on Signing the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act of 1996 and an Exchange With Reporters, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1403,
1404 (Aug. 5, 1996). For a comprehensive and critical discussion of the political
tensions that surround ILSA see Toby Reth, New Iranian-Libyan Sanctions Will
Only Hurt U.S., WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1996, at A14.
21. See 1 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET. AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 6-7 (2d ed. 1990). The U.S currently maintains an almost complete prohibi-
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stitutes a secondary boycott,' goes a step further by subjecting foreign persons to sanctions for trading with Iran or Libya.
Considering the fact that a number of major U.S. trading partners maintain close continuing economic ties with Iran and
Libya, it is no wonder that the statute has caused outrage in
the international community.'
In the first few months after ILSA was enacted, a number
of foreign firms and entities entered into transactions with
Iran that arguably could have triggered mandatory sanctions
under the statute.' These transactions were either completely
ignored or dismissed by the United States as merely violating
the spirit but not the letter of the statute.' Due to the lack of
enforcement surrounding ILSA, it has been suggested that the
statute was merely election year legislation which will never
be applied in any meaningful way.26 In January 1997, howevtion against domestic persons trading with Iran. See generally Iranian Transactions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 (1996); see also Exec. Order No. 12,959, 60 Fed.
Reg. 24,757 (1995). A similar embargo is maintained against Libya. See generally
Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 550 (1996).
22. The U.S. prohibition against domestic persons trading with Iran and Libya
constitutes a primary boycott, since it involves one country refusing to trade with
another. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Agora: The Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419, 429 (1996); see also supra
note 21. ILSA, in contrast, is considered a secondary boycott because it involves
one country (e.g., the United States) sanctioning other countries for doing business
with a third country (e.g., Iran or Libya). Cf id. Lowenfeld, supra, at 429-30 (describing concept of "secondary boycott" in context of legislation similar to ILSA).
23. The members of the EU import nearly 20% of their oil from Iran and
Libya. See Bruce W. Nelan, Taking on the World, TIME, Aug. 26, 1996, at 26, 27.
In particular, Germany and Italy have strong economic relationships with Iran.
See Roth, supra note 20. It been suggested that Italy's economy would collapse if
it complied with ILSA's mandate to stop dealing with Iran. See id.
24. ILSA does not operate retroactively so transactions before August 5, 1996
would not be grounds for the imposition of sanctions under the statute. See Iran
and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 5(a), (b)(2), 110 Stat.
1541, 1543 (1996). Since ILSA has entered into force, however, a number of arguably sanctionable investments have gone unanswered. For example, oil companies
from Malaysia and France entered into a $600 million contract to develop Iranian
oil fields two weeks after ILSA was signed without being accused of violating the
statute. See Political Outlook, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG. Q. REP., Sept. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11146997. Turkey has also challenged ILSA by entering into a
$40 million a year natural gas deal with fran. See Steven Erlanger, Turkey-Iran
Gas Deal: A Test of U.S. Law on Terror?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1996, at A7. While
the United States issued several public warnings to Turkey regarding this deal,
sanctions were never imposed because ILSA's provisions were not technically violated. See James M. Dorsey, Turkish Leader's Islamic Tilt Vexes West, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 30, 1996, at A6.
25. See supra note 24.
26. See Nelan, supra note 23, at 27; see also Amy Sorter, Despite Political
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er, the Department of State published a list of "significant projects" that have been publicly tendered in Iran's oil and gas
sectors and could potentially subject foreign investors to sanctions under ILSA17 While the "significant projects" list does
not indicate that any final determinations to impose sanctions
have been made, it was a clear warning to firms who might
invest in those projects.'
In July 1997, a Canadian firm boldly defied this warning
by signing a $212 million contract to develop the Balal oil field
in fran, which was among the designated "significant projects."' While no action has been taken as of yet, there are
signs that this investment may result in the first imposition of
sanctions under ILSA. 0 Moreover, based on the behavior of
foreign firms after ILSA's enactment,"1 and due to the fact
that many foreign firms are subject to counter-legislation that
prohibits compliance with ILSA,"2 it seems likely that more

Posturing,Election Shouldn't Effect Trade, DALLAS BUS. J., Sept. 27, 1996, at C9.
27. Significant Projects Which Have Been Tendered in the Oil and Gas Sector
in Iran, 62 Fed. Reg. 1141 (1997) [hereinafter Significant Projects]. The "significant
projects" listed include the following- (1) South Pars Gasfield Development Project;
(2) AMAK Gas Processing Facility; (3) Doroud Oilfield Expansion Project; (3)
Salman Field Khuff Gas Reservoir (Dalan Foirmation) Development; (4) Bandar
Abbas Condensate Refinery (Number 9 Refinery); (5) Shiraz Refinery Expansion;
(6) NGL-1200 Facility;, (7) NGL-1300 Facility;, (8) Lavan Island LPG Facility; (9)
Balal Oilfield Development Project; and (9) Soroush Oilfield Development Project.
See id.
28. See Maureen Lorenzetti, PLATr'S OILGRAM NEWS, Jan. 8, 1997, available in

1997 WL 887692; see also U.S Blacklists Iran Projects, THE OIL DAILY, Jan. 10,
1997, at 5.
29. See Kimberly Music, Bow Valley Says It Won't Let Sanctions Law Affect
Iranian Efforts Or Initial Stock Offering, THE OIL DAILY, Aug. 6, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 8666536; see also Significant Projects, supra note 27.
30. See Music, supra note 29.
31. Since ILSA was passed, a number of foreign firms have shown a willingness to carry on with new and existing oil and gas projects with Iran and Libya
despite the threat of sanctions. See Libya: HydrocarbonsProjects Go On In Defiance of US, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG. Q. REP., Jan. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL
9697644. Agip, an Italian firm, has continued to proceed on the $3 billion West
Libya Gas Development Project. See id. Similarly, the Red Sea Oil Corporation, a
Canadian company, has announced intentions to start work on an oil exploration
program in Libya's Sirte basin. See id. Finally, Turkey entered into a $40 million
a year gas deal with Iran almost immediately after ILSA came into force, but
sanctions were never imposed. See Dorsey, supra note 24; see also Erlanger, supra
note 24.
32. In 1996, the EU enacted a regulation prohibiting its members from complying with ILSA. See Council Regulation 2271/96, arts. 5, 11, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 1,
2-4.
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firms will challenge U.S. resolve to enforce the statute in the
near future. As such, the president will find it increasingly
difficult to abstain from imposing sanctions without undermining ILSA's supposedly "mandatory" character. Since ILSA has
a five year sunset provision, the problem is not going to disappear any time soon."3 It is therefore quite possible that sanctions under ILSA will be imposed in the not so distant future.
Critics have compared ILSA to the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996' (Helms-Burton Act), another piece of recent legislation that has been
heavily criticized within the international community.35 The
Helms-Burton Act is similar to ILSA in that it also involves
the imposition of various sanctions against foreign nationals
and corporations that engage in certain forms of trade with
Cuba.36 A formal request for dispute settlement was initiated
in the World Trade Organization (WTO) by the European Union (EU) concerning the Helms-Burton Act on October 8, 1996,
two months after ILSA went into effect." This request
spurred a heated debate over the legitimacy of trade restrictions imposed for national security reasons, 8 an issue that
has placed considerable strain on the WTO's dispute resolution
mechanism." While the Helms-Burton complaint was later

33. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 13(b),
110 Stat. 1541, 1548 (1996).
34. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091). For more information on the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
1996 (Helms-Burton Act) see generally Lowenfeld, supra note 22.
35. See Jeffrey L. Snyder, ILSA Perplexes Foreign Firms, NATL L. J, Oct. 7,
1996, at Cl; see also Tom Buerkle, EU Frames Law to Defy U.S. Bill on Cuban
Trade, INTL HERALD TRIB., July 31, 1996, at 1.

36. See generally 22 U.S.C. §§ 6082-6091 (1994).
37. See United States-The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act,
GATT Doc. WT/DS38/12 (Oct. 8, 1996) (request for the establishment of a panel by
the European Communities); see also Panels Established On US' "Helms-Burton"
and India's Patent Treatment, 14 WTO FocuS 2 (1996).
38. This debate was primarily concerned with the interpretation of Article XXI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATTI. See generally John H. Jackson
& Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Helms-Burton, the U.S., and the WTO, ASIL FLASH INSIGHT, March 1997, at 1-2. Article XXI, also known as the security exception,
allows WTO Members to derogate from their obligations under the GATT where
national security interests are at stake. See GATT, supra, art. XXI. For an in
depth discussion of the GATTs security exception see supra Part IV.E.
39. See Jackson & Lowenfeld, supra note 38.
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suspended pending further negotiations, there is a strong possibility that a similar challenge will be brought in relation to
ILSA if sanctions under the statute are imposed.40
This Note will analyze the feasibility and repercussions of
such a challenge in the context of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)4 and the Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP).42 In particular, this Note focuses on
three of ILSA's sanction provisions:43 (1) the refusal of licenses for exports of certain goods to sanctioned parties (export
sanction);" (2) the prohibition of imports from sanctioned par-

40. See R.W. Apple Jr., Split Over Cuba Is Eased by U.S. and Europeans,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1997, at Al; see also United States-The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act, GATT Doe. WT/DS38/5 (Apr. 25, 1997) (communication
from the chairman of the panel). As part of the agreement that was reached between the EU and the United States regarding the suspension of the Helns-Burton complaint, the EU has reserved the right to resume panel proceedings or initiate additional proceedings if any of its companies are sanctioned under ILSA. See
Preston Brown & David A. Baron, WTO Proceedings on the Helms-Burton Act
Suspended, CURTs, MALLET-PREVOST, COLT & MOSLE, INT'L REPORT, May 1997, at

6, 7. No commitments to grant waivers under ILSA have been made as of yet. See
id.
41. GATT, supra note 38.
42. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement],
Annex 4, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; Hein's

No. KAV 4051 [hereinafter AGP]. The AGP referred to in this Note entered into
force on January 1, 1996. See id. art. XXIV(1). It superseded the 1979 Agreement
on Government Procurement, Apr. 10, 1979, T.I.AS. No. 10403, 1235 U.N.T.S. 258.
See AGP art. XXIV(3)(c). For background on the evolution of the 1996 and 1979
agreements see Joseph F. Dennin & Jamie L. Boucher, 1996 WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement, 2 L. & Prac. World Trade Org. (Oceana), Booklet E, 1,
at 1-3 (Dec. 1995).
43. The sanctions that are not discussed in this Note are financial in nature
and would fall within the framework of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
rather than the WTO, which deals primarily with international trade issues. See
discussion infra Part H; see also Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-172, § 6(1), (3)-(4), 110 Stat. 1541, 1545 (1996). The one WTO agreement
which covers financial measures is the General Agreement on Trade in Services,
Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1B, Annex on Financial Services, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 28; 33 I.L.M. 1167, 1189
(1994) [hereinafter GATS]. The GATS would not apply to ILSA's financially based
sanctions, however, because the United States withdrew the bulk of its commitments in the area of financial services under that agreement on June 29, 1995.
See Kristin Leigh Case, The Daiwa Wake-up Call: The Need For International
Standards for Banking Supervision, 26 GA. J. IN'L & COMP. L. 215, 227-28
(1996).
44. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 6(2)(i)-(iv).
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ties (import sanction);45 and (3) the prohibition of the U.S.
government from entering into procurement contracts with
sanctioned parties (procurement sanction).46 Part II of this
Note provides a brief overview of the GATT legal system and
the role of the WTO. Part III presents an illustration of the
procedural workings of the WTO's dispute resolution system by
examining the procedural aspects of a hypothetical challenge to
ILSA in the WTO. Part IV evaluates some of the substantive
arguments that may be raised during the course of such a
challenge, including the negative repercussions of an invocation of the GATT's security exception by the United States.47
Part V analyzes the potential effects of an adverse decision on
ILSA in the WTO's dispute resolution mechanism. Finally,
Part VI concludes by arguing that ILSA cannot be enforced in
any meaningful way unless the United States is willing to
invoke the GATT's security exception, an action that is likely
to do irreparable harm to the WTO's institutional framework
in the long term.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE

GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE WTO

The "Bretton Woods System,"48 established at the conclusion of World War II in an effort to regulate international
economic relations, consisted of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank), and the GATT.49 The IMF and
the World Bank are institutions that deal primarily with the
The
financial side of international economic relations."
GATT, in contrast, has been the "the principal international
multilateral treaty for trade" since its inception in 1947."'
While the GATT was never intended to be a true organization,
45. See id. § 6(6).
46. See id. § 6(5).
47. The GATT's security exception allows Members of the WTO to derogate
from their obligations under that agreement in certain situations where national
security issues are at stake. See GATT, supra note 38, art. XXI.
48. The Bretton Woods System derives its name from Bretton Woods Conference where the agreements that established the IMF and the World Bank were
concluded. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 278

(3d ed. 1995). The Bretton Woods Conference, in turn, was named for Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire, where it was held. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. Id. at 289.
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it was treated like one for the first four decades of its existence.52 The GATT was originally intended to operate within
the broader institutional framework of the International Trade
Organization (ITO)."3 The ITO never came into being, however, and the GATT eventually became the "third leg' of the
Bretton Woods System."' 4 The gap left by the demise of the
ITO remained unfilled until 1995, when the WTO was established following a series of trade negotiations known as the
Uruguay Round.55
The WTO, which has been called the most important result of the Uruguay Round, provides the organizational identity that was previously lacking in the GATT legal system. 6
While the GATT itself is limited to trade in goods,57 a number
of related agreements are currently in force that govern international trade in a broad range of other areas.5" Some of the
covered areas include services, intellectual property rights, and
government procurement. 9 The WTO is charged with the
task of facilitating the implementation, administration, and

52. See id.; see also John H. Jackson, Managing the Trading System: The
World Trade Organization and the Post Uruguay Round GATT Agenda, in MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY 131, 134 (Peter B. Kenen ed., 1994).
53. See Jackson, supra note 52, at 134.
54. Id.
55. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 289-90. The Uruguay Round was
the eighth and most recent round of broad trade negotiations under the GATT.
See Jackson, supra note 52, at 131. The negotiations in the Uruguay Round culminated in the signing of the Final Act in Marrakesh on April 15, 1994 which made
considerable changes to the entire GATT system. See id. at 131-34; see also Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
1, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
56. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 289; Jackson, supra note 52, at
134.
57. Cf. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 893.
58. See id. at 302-03. These agreements are either classified as multilateral or
plurilateral. See id. Multilateral trade agreements are binding on all of the Members of the WTO. See id. at 302. Plurilateral trade agreements are only binding on
Members of the WTO that specifically consent to be bound. See id. at 303.
59. See id.at 302-03. Trade in services and intellectual property rights are
covered by multilateral agreements that were negotiated during the Uruguay
Round. See id. at 291. Government procurement, in contrast, was originally covered by a plurilateral treaty that came into force after the earlier Tokyo Round of
GATT trade negotiations. See id. at 303, 551. The Tokyo Round government procurement treaty was subsequently superseded by an improved government procurement treaty that was also negotiated in the Uruguay Round. See id. at 551.
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operation of the GATT and any of these related agreements. °
Disputes between WTO Members must be settled using the

organization's dispute resolution mechanism."'
The operation of the WTO dispute resolution mechanism

involves two basic stages. First, Members must enter into
formal consultations with other Members with respect to mat-2

ters involving the GATT or any other related agreement.

Second, disputes that are not settled during formal consultations may be resolved by the WTO.a Disputes that proceed to
this resolution stage are examined by dispute settlement pan-

els" and an Appellate Body.' Panels are analogous to trial
courts in that they make findings of fact in addition to interpreting the law.66 In contrast, the Appellate Body is analo-

gous to an appellate court in that it only hears appeals of panel decisions and may only review issues of law.

Panels and

the Appellate Body render decisions through reports which,
like judicial opinions, are often supported by various forms of

authority." Perhaps the most common source of authority
relied upon are prior panel reports which, while not binding
within the meaning of stare decisis, tend to carry considerable

persuasive weight in future cases.69
60. See WTO Agreement art. M(1).
61. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, art. 23.1, LEGAL INsTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1; 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1241 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU]; see also Friedl Weiss, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Economic Order of WTO Member States, in CHALLENGES TO THE NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 83 (Pitou Van Dijck & Gerrit Faber eds., 1996). The WTO's dispute
resolution mechanism involves some significant departures from prior GATT practices regarding the settlement of disputes. Some significant changes are: (1) the
creation of the Appellate Body to review panel interpretations of GATT related
legal issues; (2) the automatic adoption of panel or Appellate Body reports in absence of a unanimous vote of rejection by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB); and
(3) the automatic power for complaining parties to retaliate if panel recommendations are not implemented or there is no satisfactory solution to the matter. See
generally JACKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 340-44.
62. See DSU art. 4; see also infra text Part III.B.
63. See generally DSU arts. 6-19; see also infra text Part III.C.&D.
64. See infra Part III.C.
65. See infra Part I.D.
66. See DSU art. 11.
67. See id. art. 17(6).
68. See infra Part III.C.&D.
69. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 89-90 (4th prtg.
1991). Many of the panel reports discussed in this Note were rendered prior to
the Uruguay Round and were never adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
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IH. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A CHALLENGE TO ILSA IN THE
WTO
To effectively analyze the substantive issues that may be
raised if ILSA is challenged in the WTO, it is important to
understand the procedural workings of the WTO's dispute
resolution mechanism. This Part examines the procedural
steps involved in bringing a hypothetical challenge to ILSA in
the WTO under provisions of the GATT and the AGP. The
major procedural steps would include: (1) a request by the
party initiating the challenge to enter into consultations with
the United States; (2) the establishment of a panel by the
WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 0 for purposes of examining the dispute; (3) if the losing party should decide to appeal the panel's findings, the submission of the panel's decision
to the WTO Appellate Body for judicial review; and (4) either
compliance with the panel or appellate body's final decision, or
the authorization of certain remedial measures for the complaining party by the WTO.
A.

Standing to Bring an Action in the WTO

The WTO Agreement states, in pertinent part, that "[tlhe
WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the
conduct of trade relations among its Members."' Membership
in the WTO is limited to either states or separate customs
territories.7 2 Non-governmental "persons" that are sanctioned

Because the Uruguay Round results made it almost impossible for the adoption of
future panel reports to be blocked, the author takes the position that the mere
fact that a pre-Uruguay round report was not adopted does not effect its usefulness as persuasive authority. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 342-43.
70. The DSB was established to oversee the administration of the rules and
procedures that are embodied in the DSU. See DSU art. 2(1). These rules and
procedures govern the entire WTO dispute resolution mechanism. See id. art 1.
The primary powers of the DSB include the authority to: (1) establish panels; (2)
adopt panel and appellate body reports; (3) oversee the implementation of adopted
panel reports; and (4) authorize retaliation for violations of WTO covered agreements. See id. Although all WTO Members are represented on the DSB, participation in any dispute involving a plurilateral trade agreement, such as the AGP, is
limited to those DSB members who are parties to that plurilateral agreement. See
id.
71. WTO Agreement art. II.
72. See id. art. XII. The contracting parties to the GATT when the WTO
Agreement entered into force are considered original Members of the WTO. See id.
art. XI(1).

516

BROOK. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. MUII:2

under ILSA, such as private corporations, will be forced to rely
on their respective governments to challenge the statute in the
WTO." Furthermore, in most cases, ILSA could only be challenged by governments that are "Members"74 within the
meaning of the WTO Agreement.75
B. Consultations
Assuming the party that plans to challenge ILSA in the
WTO (the complaining party) has standing to do so, the first
step would be for that party to request consultations with the
United States under the GATT and the AGP.76 The GATT
contains two basic consultation provisions. The first of these
provisions, contained in Article XXII, requires Members to
provide adequate opportunity for consultations regarding such
"representations" as may be made by other Members with
respect to any matter affecting the operation of the GATT. 7
The second consultation provision, located in Article XXIII,
allows any Member, upon determining that its benefits under
the GATT are being "nullified or impaired," to make "written
representations or proposals" to any other Members which it

73. It has been suggested that non-governmental organizations should be allowed to participate directly in the WTO dispute resolution system. For a good
overview of the debate over participation of non-governmental organizations in the
WTO see generally G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and
Particpation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 359 (1996); see also generally G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and
International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44
DUKE L.J. 829 (1995); Phillip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade
OrganizationDisputes to Nongovernmental Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295
(1996).
74. The contracting parties to the GAT as of the date that the WTO Agreement entered into force are considered original Members of the WTO. See WTO
Agreement art. XI(2). Other states or separate customs territories can become
Members through accession under Article X11 of the WTO agreement. See id. art.
XHII.
75. See generally 2 GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATI LAw AND
PRACTICE 644 (6th ed., 1995) [hereinafter ANALYICAL INDEX]. This requirement
also applies to the United States, which is itself a Member of the WTO. See id. at
1152. If the United States were not a WTO Member, it would not be subject to
the organization's dispute resolution mechanism.
76. Members are required to attempt to settle disputes through consultations
in accordance with the provisions of the relevant covered agreements before resorting to further action under the DSU. See DSU art. 4(2).
77. GAIT, supra note 38, art. XXH(1).
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considers to be concerned.7' Requests for consultations are
included in these written representations or proposals and
Members must give "sympathetic consideration" to any such
requests.79 There are similar consultation provisions in the
AGP.8°
After an appropriate request for consultations has been
made, the United States would be obliged to enter into good
faith discussions with the complaining party within thirty
days.8 ' Once the discussions are underway, the parties would
have sixty days to resolve the dispute amongst themselves
before a panel could be established at the request of the complaining party. Several of ILSA's provisions are geared towards settling any dispute over the statute during this consultations stage.' The clearest example of one of ILSA's consultation provisions is found in Section 9(a)(1) which states that,
once the president determines that he is obligated to sanction
a foreign "person," he is urged to "initiate consultations immediately with the government with primary jurisdiction over
that foreign person."" This provision and WTO/GATT practice
make it unlikely that the United States will fail to respond to
a consultations request."
To further facilitate consultations, ILSA gives the president two opportunities to delay the imposition of sanctions
during the consultation process.86 First, Section 9(a)(2) of
ILSA provides that the president may delay the imposition of
sanctions for up to ninety days while consultations are in progress. This delay would help to relieve some of the pressure
during consultations which, as previously discussed, would
have to go on for at least sixty days before a panel could be

78. Id. art. XX=I(1).
79. Id.
80. See AGP art. XXII(2).
81. See DSU art. 4(3).
82. See id. art. 4(7).
83. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, IRAN OIL SANCTIONS
ACT OF 1996, H.R. Rep No. 104-523, pt. I, at 15-16 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1296, 1304-05 [hereinafter INT'L RELATIONS REPORT]; see also WAYS &
MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 11-12.
84. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 9(a)(1), 110
Stat. 1541, 1546 (1996).
85. Cf DSU art. 4(3).
86. See WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 11-12, 17-18.
87. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 9(a)(2).
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established to examine the dispute.' Second, Section 9(a)(3)
of ILSA provides for an additional ninety day delay on sanctions if the president certifies to Congress that the foreign
government with primary jurisdiction over the sanctioned
"person" is in the process of taking "specific and effective actions" to terminate the activities which triggered the sanctions.89 By permitting sanction delays based on "specific and
effective actions," Section 9(a)(3) will allow the president to
provide relief for nations that have taken specific affirmative
steps towards eliminating the underlying sanctionable conduct
pursuant to any agreements that are worked out during consultations. 0
Two other ILSA provisions that are designed to effect the
consultation process involve presidential authority to waive
sanctions.9 ' The importance of these waiver provisions can be
stated simply: unless the president has the power to remove
sanctions or the threat of sanctions, foreign nations will have
no incentive to come to any sort of agreement with the United
States during consultations.
The first of the two waiver provisions, located in Section
4(c) of ILSA, allows the president to waive sanctions that have
been imposed against nationals of a foreign country for investing in Iran if that country agrees to undertake "substantial
measures, including economic sanctions," that will inhibit
Iran's efforts to accumulate weapons of mass destruction and
support international terrorism.92 Since Section 4(c) only refers to sanctions that were imposed for investing in Iran, waiv-

88. See DSU art. 4(7).
89. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 9(a)(2), (3).
90. See iU § 9(a)(3). Specifically, Section 9(a)(3) of ILSA states that the additional 90 day delay can be granted if "the government with primary jurisdiction
over the person concerned is in the process of taking the actions described in [Section 9(a)(2)]." Id. (emphasis added). Section 9(a)(2), in turn, contains the "specific
and effective actions" requirement. I& § 9(a)(2). The phrase "in the process" in
Section 9(a)(3), as well as ILSA's legislative history, suggests that a sanction delay
cannot be granted unless actual steps are taken, as opposed to merely being
agreed to by the sanctioned country. See id. § 9(a)(3); see also WAYS & MEANS
REPORT, supra note 10, at 17-18.
91. See 142 CONG. REc. H8126 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) ("[ilt is my hope that
the President will be able to use waivers and the possibility of sanctions to open
a window of opportunity for negotiations on multilateral steps that would be more
effective than unilateral sanctions in influencing the conduct of Iran and Libya.")
(statement of Rep. Hamilton).
92. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act §§ 2, 4(c)(1).
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ers under this section would have no bearing on consultations
with nations whose nationals are sanctioned for entering into
transactions with Libya." With respect to sanctions that are
imposed for investing in Iran, however, Section 4(c)'s effectiveness as a consultation tool will fall primarily on how broadly
the trigger phrase "substantial measures, including economic
sanctions" is interpreted.'
ILSA's legislative history indicates that a primary goal of
the statute is the establishment of a multilateral approach to
containing the Iranian threat.95 The United States has responded to this threat unilaterally by imposing a near total
embargo against Iran. 6 From a multilateral perspective, this
embargo approach has met with widespread rejection by most
of the major U.S. trading partners.9 7 It is therefore not surprising that the House Committee on Ways and Means report

on ILSA suggested the term "substantial measures" should not
be interpreted as requiring nations to adopt policies that are
"modeled precisely on U.S. measures" in order to qualify for a
waiver under Section 4(c).9" The question still remains, how-

93. See id. §§ 4(c), 5(a).
94. Id. § 4(c)(1).
95. See WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 12 ("[fit is the strong view
of the Committee that a multilateral approach to containing threats from Iran will
prove to be the most effective in the long run."); 142 CONG. REC. H6478 (daily ed.
June 18, 1996) (ILSA "puts a priority on supporting the achievement of a multilateral agreement to isolate Iran economically.") (statement of Rep. Archer). Several sections of ILSA describe the Iranian threat in terms of that country's efforts to
acquire weapons of mass destruction and support acts of international terrorism.
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act §§ 2(1), 3(a). ILSA seeks to contain this threat by
inhibiting Iran's ability to develop it's petroleum resources, and therefore finance
these activities. See WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 10.
96. See generally Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 (1996);
Exec. Order No. 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (1995); see also INT RELATIONS REPORT, supra note 83, at 9-10. Also note that the United States employs a similar
embargo approach against Libya. See generally Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31
C.F.R. pt. 550 (1996).
97. For a good discussion of the widely negative international reaction to the
U.S. trade embargo against Iran see Michael Gaugh, GA7T Article =27 and U.S.
Export Controls: The Invalidity of Nonessential Non-Proliferation Controls, 8 N.Y.
INT'L L. REV. 51, 85 (1995).
98. WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 12. There is some evidence
that the United States and the EU are working towards an agreement that may
result in waivers under ILSA. In April of 1997, as part of the agreement that
resulted in the suspension of the Helms-Burton complaint, the EU and the United
States pledged to work together towards the goal of granting waivers to EU companies under ILSA. See Brown & Baron, supra note 40, at 7. So far, however,
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ever, as to when a specific set of measures would justify a
waiver under Section 4(c). The language of the section's trigger
phrase points to at least two criteria that should be used for
making this determination.' First, the phrase "substantial
measures" suggests that the measures must be real and not
illusory.0 0 Second, the term "economic sanctions" suggests
that the measures would be required to have at least some economic basis. 1" By basing Section 4(c) waivers on these two
broad requirements, the president would have the authority to
consider a wider range of potential settlement proposals during
the consultations stage of a dispute over ILSA.
ILSA's second waiver provision, contained in Section 9(c),
gives the president the authority to waive any ILSA sanction if
he determines and reports to Congress that "it is important to
the national interest of the United States to exercise such
waiver authority.""2 Section 9(c) is likely to prove to be a
valuable tool during consultations for two reasons. First, unlike Section 4(c), Section 9(c) can be used to waive sanctions
that are imposed under any provision of ILSA."' Second, the
president is given a large amount of discretion with respect to
when sanctions can be waived under Section 9(c). 4 The
broad scope of presidential authority to grant waivers under
Section 9(c) stems from the trigger phrase, "important to the
national interest." 5 While this language is vague on its face,
ILSA's legislative history suggests that Section 9(c)'s primary

neither sanctions nor waivers have been invoked. See id.
99. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 4(c).
100. See WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 12.
101. The one category of economic measures that ILSA specifically suggests are
measures which limit Iran's ability to develop its petroleum resources. See Iran
and Libya Sanctions Act §§ 3(a), 4(a). ILSA's legislative history, however, suggests
that Section 4(c) only requires that the measures adopted advance ILSA's broader
goals of inhibiting Iran's ability to develop weapons of mass destruction and support acts of international terrorism. See WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at
12. Section 4(c)'s only mandatory requirement with respect to measures restricting
Iran's ability to develop its petroleum resources is that a report be submitted to
Congress detailing the status of those measures. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
§§ 3(a), 4(b)(1), (c)(1).
102. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 9(c)(1).
103. See id. § 9(c)(1). Section 4(c) of Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, in contrast,
is limited to sanctions imposed against foreign nationals for investing in Iran. See
id. §§ 4(c), 5(a).
104. See WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 18.

105. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 9(c)(1).
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purpose is to ensure that the president is not forced to impose
sanctions under ILSA when doing so would be harmful to the
United States.0 6 The report by the Committee on Ways and
Means on ILSA provided a list of circumstances under which it
might be appropriate for the president to waive sanctions under Section 9(c), including cases where: (1) "a particular sanction would raise significant issues under the international obligations of the U.S.;" and (2) "international cooperation in pursuit of [ILSA's] goals... could be jeopardized, rather than
assisted, through unilateral U.S. action." °7 The first of these
circumstances might occur in the context of consultations if the
president determines that the consulting nation has made a
particularly compelling argument which suggests that the
imposition of sanctions would violate U.S. trade obligations.
With respect to the second circumstance, Section 9(c) could be
exercised where the United States and other consulting nations have settled on measures, other than total trade embargoes, which would still advance ILSA's ultimate goal of containing Iran and Libya's efforts to support international terrorism and accumulate weapons of mass destruction.0 8 These
scenarios illustrate that Section 9(c) grants the president a
broad range of discretion to waive sanctions in order to settle
ILSA disputes during consultations. If the president chooses to
exercise this discretion, Section 9(c) could prove to be the most
useful provision in ILSA in terms of settling disputes over the
statute during consultations.
Despite the fact that ILSA was carefully drafted to encourage the settlement of any dispute during consultations, as one
member of Congress pointed out during the ILSA debates,
"waivers and sanctions are blunt policy instruments."" 9 The

106. See 142 CONG. REC. H6478 (daily ed. June 18, 1996) ("[in this and all
other cases the President has authority to waive sanctions if their application
would hurt the national interest.") (statement of Rep. Archer referring to Section

9(c) of ILSA).
107. WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 18. The report also suggests

that 9(c) waivers might be appropriate where: (1) the "imposition of sanctions
would threaten U.S. intelligence sources and methods;" and (2) "sanctions would
lead to unacceptable costs to U.S. economic interests." Id.
108. While there are indications that negotiations may take place which could
result in waivers being granted under ILSA in relation to the EU, no solid action
has been taken. See Brown & Baron, supra note 40, at 7.
109. 142 CONG. REC. H8126 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Rep. Ham-

ilton).
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United States and its trading partners have distinctly competing philosophies with respect to the appropriate approach for
dealing with rogue nations such as Iran and Libya."' The
threat of sanctions is likely to make this debate even more
heated, rather than encouraging any kind of agreement."' As
such, there is a good possibility that even the most consultation friendly ILSA provisions will be unable to prevent a dispute over the statute from being resolved by the WTO. If consultations fail to result in some sort of settlement within the
requisite sixty day period, the complaining party can trigger
the next step in the WTO's dispute resolution process, the
establishment of a DSB panel to examine the ILSA dispute.12

C. Establishmentof a Panel by the DSB
Due to the obstacles to the settlement of a dispute over
ILSA during consultations, a panel would probably have to be
convened in order to examine any challenge to the statute in
the WTO."' Historically, the authority to establish panels to
examine GATT related disputes is derived from Article
XXIII." The language of Article XXIII, however, provides
almost no guidance as to how panels should be established or

110. As previously discussed, the U.S. trade policy with respect to Iran and
Libya consists of an almost total embargo. See generally Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 (1996); Exec. Order No. 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757
(1995). In contrast, the EU trades with Iran while the two entities regularly engage in a series of bilateral negotiations that have been described as "critical dialogue." See Gaugh, supra note 97, at 85-86. Other nations have totally rejected the
U.S. approach and trade with Iran and Libya freely. See id.
111. This is reflected in the following statement by EU Vice President Leon
Brittan, made shortly after ILSA was signed:
"[ILSA] established the unwelcome principle that one country can dictate
the foreign policy of others and disturbs the unity of purpose between
allies that is so necessary if we are to stamp out terrorism successfully
together' ....
"The EU... will act to defend its rights and interests
if they are jeopardized by this legislation."
John M. Broder & Mary Williams Walsh, Clinton Signs Bill Aimed at Foreign
Firms in Libya, Iran Sanctions: President sees long, hard struggle' against terrorism. EU official vows to defend European interests, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 11256064.
112. See DSU art. 4(7).
113. See supra Part III.B.
114. See JACKSON, supra note 69, at 94-95. Panels have been used to examine
GATT related disputes since the mid-1950s. See id. at 95.
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conducted."' In substance, Article XXIII provides only, that
if the parties to a dispute fail to come to a satisfactory settle-

ment within a reasonable time: (1) the matter may be referred
to the Ministerial Conference... of the WTO; and (2) the Ministerial Conference shall promptly investigate any such matter
and make appropriate recommendations or rulings." More
detailed procedures for the establishment of panels can be
found in the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU)," s which contains
the bulk of the rules that govern the WTO dispute resolution
mechanism." 9
Article 6 of the DSU states that "[i]f the complaining party
so requests, a panel shall be established... unless... the
DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel."2 The
DSU also provides that a consensus can only be reached if
none of the eligible DSB members,' 1 including the complain-

115. See generally GATT, supra note 38, art. XXIH.
116. The Ministerial Conference, which is composed of representatives of all of
the Members, meets once every two years to carry out the various functions of the
WTO. See WTO Agreement art. IV(1).
117. The original language of Article XXIH provides:
If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties
concerned within a reasonable time, ... the matter may be referred to
the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall
promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make
appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate.
GATT, supra note 38, art. XXIII(2).
In the Uruguay Round, the phrase "contracting party," was replaced with the word
"Member" throughout the GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, art. 2(a), LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1154, 1155 (1994).
Also, for purposes of Article XXI, the references to "CONTRACTING PARTIES"
acting jointly were agreed to refer to the Ministerial Conference. See id. art. 2(b).
118. See generally DSU arts. 6-16.
119. See Weiss, supra note 61, at 82.
120. DSU art. 6(1).
121. Since the GATT is a multilateral trade agreement, all DSB members, including the complaining party, would be eligible to vote on matters relating to
those agreements. See DSU art. 2(1). With respect to disputes involving
plurilateral trade agreements, however, voting is limited to DSB members that are
also parties to the plurilateral agreement in question. See id. While the AGP is a
plurilateral agreement, the complaining party would have to be a signatory in
order to challenge ILSA under it's provisions. Cf. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 48,
at 303 (plurilateral agreements are optional and only apply between members).
Consequently, any WTO Member that challenges ILSA under the AGP would necessarily have the right to vote on DSB matters relating to that agreement.
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ing party, formally objects.' Therefore, the establishment of
a panel is virtually guaranteed as long as the complaining
party officially requests it.'
As a general rule, DSB established panels will only examine claims that are ripe for adjudication. This principle was
stated in the first panel report that was issued under the auspices of the WTO, the panel report on the United
States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline' (Gasoline Report). The Gasoline Report determined
that panels may not usually "rule on measures that, at the
time the panel's terms of reference were fixed, were not and
would not become effective."' The only specifically recognized exception to this rule exists in cases where the offending
measures have previously been introduced and ,the prospect
remains they might be reintroduced in the future. 2 ' Therefore, a panel could only examine aspects of an ILSA complaint
related to sanctions that are either actually being imposed
against the complaining party or bear the prospect of being
reinstated at the time when the panel's terms of reference are
fixed.
During the panel proceedings, the parties to the dispute
will be given the opportunity to argue their positions." 7 Once
the arguments are completed, the panel must issue an "interim
report" in order to give the parties a final opportunity to settle

122. See DSU art. 2(4) n.1.
123. This official request must: (1) be made in writing, (2) indicate whether
consultations have been held; and (3) provide a brief summary of the grounds for
challenging LSA which is sufficient to present the problem clearly. See id. art.
6(2).
124. United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
GATT Doc. WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Gasoline Report].
125. Id. para. 6.19. While the Gasoline Report was appealed to the Appellate
Body, this was not among the issues that were raised. See generally United
States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, GATr Doc.
WT/DS2/AB/R, pt. H, (Apr. 29, 1996). Moreover, this rule is also supported by
repeated practice in past panel proceedings. See 2 ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note
75, at 648-50. A panel must have its terms of reference fixed within 20 days after
being established. See DSU art. 7(1). A panel's terms of reference define the scope
of the issues it may address. See id.
126. See Gasoline Report, supra note 124, para. 6.19 (citing EEC-Restrictions
on Imports of Apples from Chile, Nov. 10, 1980, GATT B.I.S.D. (27th Supp.) at 98
(1981)).
127. See Working Procedures, DSU app. 3, arts. 4-8, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1245-46 (1994).
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their dispute in a mutually beneficial manner." S The parties
may request the panel to review precise aspects of the interim
report. 9 When these requests have been reviewed or if no
requests are made, the interim report becomes the final report
of the panel.' The DSB must adopt the final panel report
within sixty days unless one of the immediate parties 3 ' to
the dispute notifies the DSB that it will appeal or the DSB
decides by consensus to-reject the report. 132 Since a consensus
would require the vote of the winning party, a rejection of the
final report by the DSB would be virtually impossible.'33 If a
panel report is appealed, it is reviewed by the Appellate
Body.13

D. JudicialReview Before the WTO Appellate Body
Article 17 of the DSU provides that "[a] standing Appellate
Body shall be established by the DSB."'35 Unlike panels,
which are established for the sole purpose of examining a single dispute, the Appellate Body is a continuously active institution.'36 In accordance with Article 17, the members of the Appellate Body were appointed by the DSB on November 29,
1995. While the Appellate Body is composed of seven mem-

128. See DSU art. 15(2); see also Weiss, supra note 61, at 85.
129. See DSU art. 15(2).
130. See id.
131. Third parties with a "substantial interest" in a dispute may have an opportunity to present their points of view to the panel examining that dispute. Id.
art. 10(2). Third parties cannot, however, appeal panel decisions, though they may
be heard by the Appellate Body once an appeal has been initiated. See id. art.
17(4).
132. See id. art. 16(4).
133. See id. This contrasts sharply with the process that existed prior to the
Uruguay Round where the adoption of a panel report could be blocked by the
losing party. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 342-43.
134. See DSU art. 17(1); see also supra Part III.D.
135. Id. art. 17(1).
136. See id.
137. See Appellate Body Members Appointed, 6 WTO FOCUS 1 (1995). The members of the first WTO Appellate Body include: (1) Mr. James Bacchus, of the United States, a former U.S. Congressman; (2) Mr. Christopher Beeby, of New Zealand,
a retired diplomat; (3) Professor Claus-Dieter Ehlerman, of Germany, former Director-General and Director of General Competition of the European Commission; (4)
Dr. Said EI-Naggar, of Egypt, Professor Emeritus at Cairo University and former
Executive Director of the World Bank representing the Arab countries; (5) Justice
Florentino Feliciano, of the Phillipines, Senior Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Phillipines; (6) Mr. Julio Lacarte Muro, of Uruguay, a career diplo-
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bers in total, three member divisions are established to hear
individual appeals. 3 ' Appeals are limited to the issues of law
and legal
interpretations contained in the panel report under
139
review.

The time limitations for processing appeals are extremely
short. 4" This expedited review is a direct consequence of Article 17(5) of the DSU, which states that appellate proceedings
generally shall not exceed sixty days, and in no case shall go
beyond ninety days, from the date that the appellant initiates
the appeal to the date that the Appellate Body report is circulated.' These time limitations will insure that any appeal of
a panel report on ILSA will be decided swiftly.
The Appellate Body has the authority to uphold, modify, or
reverse any of the legal findings and conclusions that are made
by a panel."" Decisions of the Appellate Body are set forth in
reports that are circulated to the Members.' Appellate Body
reports are automatically adopted thirty days after they are
circulated, unless the DSB decides otherwise by consensus.'44
Since a consensus can be blocked through a single vote by the
party that wins an appeal, Appellate Body Reports are, as a
practical matter, always adopted. 4 ' Once an Appellate Body
Report is adopted, it is unconditionally accepted by the parties
to the dispute. 46 As such, the Appellate Body will be the
court of last resort in any dispute over ILSA.

mat who has been involved with the GAIT/WTO trading system for the last 50
years; and (7) Professor Mitsuo Matsushita, of Japan, one of the most authoritative Japanese scholars in the field of international economic law. See id. at 8.
138. The DSU provides that the Appellate Body "shall be composed of seven
persons, three of whom shall serve on any one case." DSU art. 17(1). The Working
Procedures for Appellate Review (Appellate Procedures) provide that "[in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 17 of the DSU, a division consisting of three
Members shall be established to hear and decide an appeal." Working Procedures
For Appellate
Review,
art.
6(1)
(last modified
June
21,
1997)
<httpJ/www.wto.orgdisputelab3.html> [hereinafter Appellate Procedures].
139. See DSU art. 17(6).
140. See generally Appellate Procedures, supra note 138, Annex I.
141. See Letter from Julio Lucarte-Muro, Appellate Body Chairman, to Celso
Lafer, Dispute Settlement Body Chairman (Feb. 7, 1996) (visited Oct. 1, 1996)
<http'J/wto.org/wto/Pressrel/ab2.html>; see also DSU art. 17(5).
142. See DSU art. 17(13).
143. See id. art. 17(14).
144. See id.
145. See Jackson, supra note 52, at 141.
146. See DSU art. 17(14).
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IV. SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS OF A CHALLENGE TO ILSA IN THE

WTO

Unless a settlement is reached during consultations, the
broad issue of whether ILSA's import, export, or procurement
sanctions conflict with any of the U.S. obligations under the
GATT and the AGP will be resolved by a DSB established
panel, and if the panel's report is appealed, the Appellate
Body. In resolving this broad issue, however, the panel and
Appellate Body will have to examine a number of narrower
issues that will be raised by the parties to the dispute.
This Part explores some of the arguments that could be
raised by the complaining party and the United States with
respect to these narrower issues and how the panel or Appellate Body division might evaluate each side's position. The first
few sections in this Part examine potential conflicts between
ILSA's export and import sanctions and the GATT. The next
section addresses ILSA's procurement sanction in the context
of the AGP.147 The final section in this Part analyzes the feasibility and repercussions of a claim by the United States that
ILSA falls within the security exception embodied in Article
XXI of the GATT.
A. Are ILSA's Export and Import Sanctions Consistent with
the Obligations of the United States UnderArticle X of the
GATT?
Article XI of the GATT, entitled "General Elimination of
Quantitative Restrictions," states that:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or
other charges whether made effective through quotas, import
or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of

147. ILSA's procurement sanction is not examined in terms of Article I of the
GATT since it is generally considered that the most favored nation obligation does
not apply to government procurement. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 550.
ILSA's procurement sanction is also not discussed in the context of Article III of
the GATT because government procurement is specifically exempted from that
article. See GATT, supra note 38, art. IH(8). Finally, ILSA's procurement sanction
is not analyzed in terms of the GATS since government procurement is exempted
from the major articles of that agreement. See GATS, supra note 43, art. XIII(1).
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any product of the territory of any other contracting party or
on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined
for the territory of any other contracting party.'

Since ILSA's export and import sanctions operate independent-

ly of each other, the potential Article XI challenges to these
provisions are addressed separately.""

1. Does ILSA's Export Sanction Violate
Article XI of the GATT?
ILSA's export sanction, located in Section 6(2) of the stat-

ute, permits the president to prohibit the U.S. government
from issuing any specific license or granting any other specific

permission to export goods or technology to a "sanctioned person" under: (1) the Export Administration Act of 1979

(EAA);5 0 (2) the Arms Export Control Act (AECA);... (3) the

148. GATT, supra note 38, art. XI.
149. See WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 16; see also infra Part
IVA.&2.
150. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-20 (1994). The
Export Administration Act (EAA) expired in 1994 but was extended through an
executive order which was issued by President Clinton that same year. See Exec.
Order No. 12,924, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,437 (1994). This executive order was continued
in effect by notice of the president in 1995 due to lack of alternative measures by
Congress. See Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations,
60 Fed. Reg. 42,767 (1995). The EAA grants the president authority to require
licenses for the export of a broad range of goods or technology that are either
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or are exported by persons that are
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2404(a)(1),
2405(a)(1), 2406(a)(1). The specific licensing requirements for goods or technology
that are regulated under the EAA are contained in the Export Administration
Regulations, 15 C.F.R. ch. VII, subch. C (1997), which were established in order to
implement the EAA. See id. § 730.2; see also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2414(b). A listing of
items which require export licenses under the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR) can be found in the Commerce Control List (CCL). See 15 C.F.R. pt. 774.
The EAR provides for various license exceptions that allow the export of items
listed in the CCL without a specific license when certain conditions are satisfied.
See id § 740.1. These conditions vary depending on the nature, destination, and
end use of the exported item. See Export Administration Regulation, Simplification
of Export Administration Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg 12,714, 12,720 (1996) (to be
codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 730-799A). In July of 1996, the House of Representatives
passed a bill known as the Export Administration Act of 1996, H.R. 361, 104th
Cong. (1996), which is designed to replace the EAA. See House Passes Reinstatement of Export Controls, THE WEEK IN CONGRESS, July 19, 1996, at 1-2. If the
Export Bill becomes law, it will operate through the year 2001. See H.R. 361

§ 120.
151. Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C.

§§ 2751-2796d (1994). Export regula-
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Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA);1 2 or (4) any other statute
that requires prior review or approval of the U.S. government
as a condition: for the export or re-export of goods or services.153 Together, the EAA, AECA, and AEA require specific licenses to be issued for the export of a wide variety of items
that fall within the jurisdiction of the United States.'5
ILSA's export sanction would permit the president to prevent
the issuance of any such "specific license" under the EAA,
AECA, AEA or any other similar legislation for items that are
to be exported to "sanctioned person[s].
Assuming that the sanctioned persons are within the territory of the complaining party, it could be argued that the denial of export licenses in this manner would be inconsistent with
the obligations of the'United States under Article XI of the
GATT. "' This rather straightforward interpretation of Article
XI is illustrated by the panel report on Canada-Measures
Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon..7
(CanadaHerringDecision), which involved a prohibition on the
export of salmon from Canada where certain processing re5 5 It was clear to both the
quirements had not been satisfied."
panel, and the parties to the dispute, that the export prohibition was contrary to Article XI of the GATT, "according to

tions under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) are limited to items that have
been designated as "defense articles and defense services" by the president. Id.
§ 2778(a)(1). These items are placed on the United States Munitions List, 22
C.F.R. pt. 121 (1996), which is separate from the CCL and does not subject items
to regulation under the EAA or EAR. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.3(b)(i). The AECA requires a specific license for the export of any item that has been placed on the
United States Munitions List. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1), (b)(2).
152. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297g-4 (1994). The Atomic
Energy Act (AEA) regulates the export of certain nuclear related materials, equipment and technology. See id. §§ 2077(a), 2092, 2111, 2156(4). The implementing
regulations for the AEA list categories of materials, equipment, and technology
that may not be exported from the United States without a specific license. See
generally Export and Import of Nuclear Equipment and Material, 10 C.F.R. pt. 110
(1997).
153. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 6(2)(i)(iv), 110 Stat. 1541, 1545 (1996).
154. See supra notes 150-152.
155. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 6(2).
156. See GATT, supra note 38, art. XI(1).
157. See Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon, Mar, 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 (1989) [hereinafter Canada Herring Decision].
158. See id. paras. 2.1-2.4.
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which contracting parties shall not institute or maintain prohibitions on the exportation of any product destined for the
territory of any other contracting party."'59 While ILSA's export sanction, which prohibits exports through the denial of
licenses, is somewhat different from the straight export prohibition that was challenged in the CanadaHerringDecision, the
two measures are equally impermissible due to Article Xrs
specific mandate against "prohibitions... made effective
through.., export licenses." 6 '
The United States could argue, in response, that Article XI
should not be interpreted in such a strict manner with respect
to ILSA's export sanction since the statute represents an effort
to combat the international threat posed by Iran and Libya's
continuous efforts to support acts of international terrorism
and acquire weapons of mass destruction.' 6 The underlying
theory would be that the contracting parties did not intend to
forego the sovereign right to combat such international threats
when they ratified Article XI of the GATT. This argument is
unlikely to be particularly persuasive, however, since a very
similar claim was rejected in the context of import restrictions
by the 1994 panel on United States-Restrictionson Import of
Tuna 6 (Tuna-Dolphin Decision II). There, the United States
argued that the GATT should not be interpreted as requiring
nations to surrender the sovereign right to impose import restrictions for the purpose of protecting the environment.'63
The panel refused to create an exception where one did not
already apply, observing that "the dispute settlement procedures cannot add to or diminish rights of contracting parties
under the [GATT]."" Since Article XI addresses import and
export prohibitions using the same language, this ruling suggests that ILSA's export sanction would be impermissible unless the United States can point to a specific exception elsewhere in the GATT." It is therefore likely that ILSA's ex-

159. Id. para. 4.1.
160. GATT, supra note 38, art. XI(l).
161. See WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 9.
162. GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33
I.L.M. 839 (1994) (unadopted) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin Decision III.
163. See id. paras. 3.9-3.10.
164. Id. paras. 5.41-5.43.
165. See GATT, supra note 38, art. XI(1). It can be argued that Article XXI,

which allows contracting parties to derogate from the GATT where national securi-
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port sanction would be held inconsistent with the obligations of
the United States under Article XI of the GATT if challenged
in the WTO's dispute resolution mechanism.
2. Does ILSA's Import Sanction Violate
Article XI of the GATT?
ILSA's import sanction, located in Section 6(6) of the statute, allows the president to restrict imports with respect to a
sanctioned person in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).116 ILSA's legislative
history supports the view that the president can use this sanction to ban the importation of any or all products by a sanctioned person, providing he does so pursuant to established
procedures under the IEEPA."6 ' This restrictive requirement
was adopted in an attempt to minimize the threat of economic
retaliation by foreign governments that might arise if ILSA's
import sanction is invoked under circumstances where other,
less harsh, sanctions might be appropriate."c
The president may take measures under the IEEPA providing: (1) an "unusual and extraordinary" foreign threat to the
"national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States" exists; and (2) the president declares a "national emergency" with respect to that threat. 69 There are also several
categories of imports which generally can not be regulated by
the president under the IEEPA, including: (1) personal communications that do not involve the transfer of anything of value;
(2) donations of items intended to relieve human suffering; (3)
information or informational materials; and (4) transactions
ty issues are at stake, provides such an exception. See id., art XXI. It is not clear,
however, whether this argument would succeed in the context of ILSA. See supra
Part IV.E.
166. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706
(1994); see also Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 6(6),
110 Stat. 1541, 1546 (1996).
167. See WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 16.

168. See id.
169. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a). It should be noted that, while these two requirements
would have to be satisfied before import sanctions could be imposed, ILSA provides that sanctions determinations by the president are not subject to judicial
review. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 11. As such, the president is likely to
have broad discretion in determining that the requirements of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) have been satisfied, without interference
from the judicial branch.
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ordinarily incident to international travel. 70 Based on the
relationship between ILSA's import sanction and the IEEPA, it
is logical to conclude that imports of items that fall under
these four categories would be exempted from any regulation
or prohibition imposed under ILSA's import sanction.'
Despite these limitations, ILSA's import sanction would
prohibit imports by sanctioned persons through methods other
than "duties, taxes or other charges" when imposed.'72 Therefore, the complaining party could argue that the invocation of
the statute's import sanction against any of its nationals would
be inconsistent with the obligations of the United States under
Article XI of the GATT. The United States could respond by
arguing that, in light of the policy interests that ILSA seeks to
promote, the statute's import sanction should not be subjected
to the requirements of Article XI.
ILSA's underlying purpose is the denial of Iran and
Libya's abilities to support acts of international terrorism and
acquire methods of mass destruction.'73 The increasing global
concern regarding the threat posed by nations that support
terrorism is reflected in a series of United Nations Security
Council Resolutions (U.N. Resolutions) that were adopted in
1992 and 1993."4 These U.N. Resolutions, which called for
the imposition of certain trade restrictions against Libya, were
a largely unsuccessful attempt to deal with that nation's involvement in the bombing of Pan American Flight 103 over
Scotland. 7 ' ILSA attempts to succeed where the U.N. Resolutions have failed by requiring the imposition of sanctions
against foreign persons who export certain items to Libya in
violation of the 1992 and 1993 U.N. Resolutions.76 The United States has long recognized that Iran, like Libya, has repeatedly supported acts of international terrorism and that both of
these nations threaten the international community as a
170. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(1)-(4).
171. See generally WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 16.

172. GATT, supra note 38, art. XI(1); see also Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
§ 6(6).
173. See WAYs. & MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 9-10.
174. See generally G.A. Res. 883, supra note 11; GA. Res. 748, supra note 11;

G.A. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3033rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (1992).
175. See G.A. Res. 883, supra note 11, at 1-5; GJA Res. 748, supra note 11, at
1-4; GA Res. 731, supra note 174, at 1-2; see also WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra

note 10, at 10-11.
176. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 5(b)(1).
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whole. Prior to the enactment of ILSA, measures were taken by the United States to prohibit domestic persons from
trading with Iran or Libya in an attempt to undermine the
ability of these nations to finance their unlawful activities. 78
The effectiveness of these measures, however, was undermined
by the willingness of other nations to invest in Iran and
Libya's petroleum sectors." The United States could claim
that, in light of these circumstances, ILSA's import sanction
should not be treated as a quantitative restriction since the
contracting parties could not have intended for Article XI to
supersede the right of sovereign nations to respond to the
unlawful activities of rogue regimes such as Iran and Libya.
Assuming for a moment that a panel is persuaded by the
proposed argument, ILSA's import sanction could be removed
from the scope of Article XI if it is treated as a permissible
internal regulation under Article 111(4) of the .GATT. is° Article 111(4) provides that "[tihe products of the territory of any
contracting party... shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. ""' ILSA's import sanction could be

177. See INTL RELATIONS REPORT, supra note 83, at 9-10; WAYS & MEANS
REPORT, supra note 10, at 9-10.
178. See generally Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 (1996);
Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 550 (1996); Exec. Order No. 12,959, 60
Fed. Reg. 24,757 (1995); see also INTL RELATIONS REPORT, supra note 83, at 9-10.
179. See INTL RELATIONS REPORT, supra note 83, at 9-10. In 1995, Conoco,
Inc., a U.S. firm, initialed a contract to develop oil fields in Iran. See id. at 10.
The transaction was prohibited by an executive order that was issued by President
Clinton. See id. The Conoco contract and several contracts for the development of
Iranian oil fields were entered into by foreign investors later that same year. See
id. The report by the Committee on Ways & Means described this as the "the
most significant setback to U.S. efforts to multilateralize the isolation of Iran." Id&
180. In a pre-WTO panel report, it was held that measures subject to the provisions of Article III are not to be examined in the context of Article XI. See Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, Feb. 7, 1984, para.
5.14, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 140, 162-63 (1984). The United States would
have to look to the provisions of the GATT in order to find a justification for
removing ILSA's import sanction from Article XI, as opposed to arguing for the
creation of an entirely new exception, because prior panel decisions have held that
a dispute settlement proceeding "cannot add to or diminish rights of contracting
parties under the General Agreement." See Tuna-Dolphin Decision H, supra note
162, para. 5.43; see also text accompanying notes 161-165.
181. GATT, supra note 38, art. 111(4).
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considered subject to Article II(4) based on the Note Ad Article III which reads as follows:
Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or requirement... which applies to an imported product
and to the like domestic product and is collected or enforced
in the case of an imported product at the time or point of
importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax
or other internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement
of the kind referred to in [Article I(1)], and is accordingly
subject to the provisions of Article HI.'
Since ILSA is designed to prevent foreign persons from
engaging in certain transactions with Iran or Libya,"' the
statute's import sanction could be characterized as an enforcement mechanism imposed at "the time or point of importation" within the meaning of the Note Ad Article III.'" The
United States could argue that ILSA's import sanction would
be permissible under Article I1(4) because domestic persons
are prohibited from engaging in the same kinds of transactions
that trigger sanctions against foreign persons under ILSA.'"
The underlying theory would be that ILSA's import sanction
would effect the "internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use" of foreign products for the
purpose of requiring foreign importers and domestic persons

182. Id., Annex 1, ad art. III. Article III(1) generally provides that "Ithe contracting parties recognize that ... laws, regulations and requirements affecting
the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of
products ... should not be applied... so as to afford protection to domestic
production." I&. art. III(1). ILSA is clearly intended to inhibit Iran and Libya's
ability to support international terrorism and acquire weapons of mass destruction
and is not designed to protect domestic production. See WAYS & MEANS REPORT,
supra note 10, at 9-10.
183. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 5(a)-(b).
184. GATT, supra note 38, Annex 1, ad art. I.
185. Foreign persons can be sanctioned under ILSA for investing $40 million or
more "that directly and significantly contributes] to the enhancement of [Iran or
Libya's] ability to develop [its] petroleum resources." Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 5(a), (b)(2), 110 Stat. 1541, 1543 (1996). Foreign
persons can also be subjected to sanctions under ILSA for exporting certain "goods,
services, technology, or other items" to Libya. Id. § 5(b)(1). Domestic persons are
barred from investing in Iran by an executive order that was made pursuant to
the IEEPA in 1995. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (1995). Domestic persons are also barred from performing any government or commercial
contract with Libya or exporting any goods, technology or services to Libya under
the Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 550.202, 550.205 (1996).
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dealing in "like products" to engage in similar trading practices
with respect to Iran and Libya.'86 The opposing position
would be that Article Ill requires foreign products to be treated no less favorably than "like products of national origin"
irrespective of any policy differences between the countries involved."8 7
Two pre-WTO panel decisions, the 1991 report on United
States-Restrictions on Import of Tuna"8 (Tuna-Dolphin Decision 1) and the subsequent Tuna-Dolphin Decision I,189
suggest that the proposed position of the United States would
not prevail. Both of these cases involved U.S. import bans on
tuna products that were harvested in a manner which resulted
in the incidental killing of dolphins.' 9 rThe import bans were
imposed pursuant to the Marine Mammal Protection Act of
1972 (MMPA),' 9 ' which was designed to promote the conservation of certain endangered marine mammals.'92 U.S. vessels were subject to similar standards regarding permissible
methods for the harvesting of tuna. 9 ' In both disputes, the
issue was raised as to whether to treat the MMPA import restriction against Mexico as an internal regulation under Article
186. GATT, supra note 38, art. I1(4). This interpretation would raise the question of whether, as a matter of customary international law, the United States can
hold foreign nationals responsible for activities that have taken place wholly outside of the borders of the United States. The United States could attempt to address this problem by invoking the doctrine of effects jurisdiction, which allows a
nation to exercise jurisdiction based on "conduct outside its territory that has . . .
substantial effect within its territory." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(c) (1987). It could be argued that
the foreign investments banned by ILSA have a substantial effect on the security
of the United States from terrorist acts within its borders that are financed by
funds originating from Iran and Libya's petroleum industries. See Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act § 5(a)-(b); see also WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 14.
187. GATT, supra note 38, art. III(4).
188. GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30
I.L.M. 1594 (1991) (unadopted) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin Decision 11.
189. Tuna-Dolphin Decision H1, supra note 162.
190. See Tuna-Dolphin Decision II, supra note 162, paras. 2.9, 2.12; Tuna-Dolphin Decision I, supra note 188, paras. 2.1-2.2, 5.17.
191. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1994)); see also Tuna-Dolphin
Decision II, supra note 162, paras. 2.9, 2.12; Tuna-Dolphin Decision I, supra note
188, pars. 5.17.
192. See Tuna-Dolphin Decision, H, supra note 162, para. 2.5; Tuna-Dolphin
Decision I, supra note 188, para. 2.3.
193. See Tuna-Dolphin Decision H, supra note 162, para. 2.6; Tuna-Dolphin
Decision I, supra note 188, para. 3.20.
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III or a quantitative restriction under Article XI." The panel
in the Tuna-Dolphin Decision I approached this issue by engaging in a three part analysis. First, the panel noted that the
"Note Ad Article III covers only internal taxes that are borne
by products .... [and] it would be inconsistent to limit the
application of this Note to taxes that are borne by products
while permitting its application to regulations not applied to
the product as such."9 ' Second, the panel determined that
the MMPA import restrictions "could not be regarded as being
applied to tuna products as such because they would not directly regulate the sale of tuna and could not possibly affect
tuna as a product."' Third, the panel held that Article III
acall[ed] for a comparison of the treatment of imported tuna as
a product with that of domestic tuna as a product."'97 The
panel in the Tuna-Dolphin Decision II, followed a similar line
of reasoning but added that Article III "[does] not [call] for a
comparison of the policies or practices of [a product's] country
of origin with those of the country of importation."' The
panels in both the Tuna-Dolphin Decision I and Tuna-Dolphin
Decision H concluded that: (1) the MMPA import prohibitions
were not internal regulations within the meaning of Article III;
(2) even if the MMPA import prohibitions were subject to Article IlI, they would not have been justified under that article;
and (3) the MMPA import prohibitions were quantitative restrictions in direct violation of Article XI. 99
ILSA's import sanction is analogous to the MMPA's import
prohibitions since both laws involve the restriction of imports
for the purpose of coercing other nations into complying with
the views of the United States on certain international policy
issues."'0 The only distinction is that the MMPA involved animal conservation issues20 ' while the policy that underlies

194. See Tuna-Dolphin Decision 11, supra note 162, paras. 3.3-3.6; Tuna-Dolphin
Decision I, supra note 188, paras. 3.10-3.11.
195. Tuna-Dolphin Decision I, supra note 188, para. 5.13.
196. Id. para. 5.14.
197. Id. para. 5.15.
198. Tuna-Dolphin Decision H, supra note 162, para. 5.8.
199. See Tuna-Dolphin Decision II, supra note 162, paras. 5.8, 5.10; Tuna-Dolphin Decision I, supra note 188, paras. 5.14, 5.15, 5.17-5.18.
200. See Tuna-Dolphin Deaision H, supra note 162, para. 3.8; Tuna-Dolphin
Decision I, supra note 188, para. 2.3.
201. See Tuna-Dolphin Decision H, supra note 162, para. 3.8; Tuna-Dolphin
Decision I, supra note 188, para. 2.3.
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ILSA is the denial of Iran and Libya's ability to support acts of
international terrorism and acquire methods of mass destruction."2 The Tuna-Dolphin Decision I and Tuna-Dolphin Decision II stand for the proposition that the policies underlying an
import prohibition have no bearing on its validity under Articles HI and XI. 03 Since the treatment of imported products
and domestic "like products" under ILSA would be based entirely on policy considerations, the statute's import sanction
would not fall within the scope of Article III.2 Furthermore,
even if Article III did apply, these panel decisions suggest that
ILSA's import sanction would be contrary to Article III(4).5
Therefore, it is likely that a panel would find that ILSA's import sanction violates Article XI of the GATT.
B.

Are ILSA's Export and Import Sanctions Consistent With
the Obligations of the United States Under Article I of the
GATT?

Even if a panel finds that ILSA is consistent with Article
XI of the GATT, the complaining party could challenge the
statute's import and export sanctions under Article I of that
agreement. Article I, entitled "General Most-Favoured-Nation
Treatment," has been described as the cornerstone of the international trade rules embodied in the GATT."' The text of Article I provides:
With respect to... all rules and formalities in connection
with importation and exportation... any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to
any product originating in or destined for any other country
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
product originating in or destined for the territories of all
other contracting parties.2
This language sets forth a fundamental principle of non-discrimination-each contracting party must grant every other

202.
203.
204.
205.

See WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 9-10.

See supra text accompanying notes 195-199.
See Tuna-Dolphin Decision II, supra note 162, para. 5.8.
See Tuna-Dolphin Decision I, supra note 188, para. 5.15.
206. GATT, supra note 38, art. I; see also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at

436.
207. GATT, supra note 38, art. I(1).
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contracting party the most favorable treatment that it grants
to any country
with respect to measures affecting imports and
208
exports.
ILSA's import and export sanctions would fall within the
scope of Article I because they are "rules ...in connection
with importation and exportation."2 9 The complaining party
could argue that these sanctions are contrary to Article I since
they can be used to ban exports and imports into the United
States from certain WTO Members while the trading practices
of other countries remain unhindered.2 0 In response, the
United States could point out that ILSA's sanctions are imposed based on certain forms of behavior by sanctioned persons
and not their national origin.2 " The complaining party's position is supported by 1952 panel report on Belgian Family Allowances212 (Belgian Report), which involved a challenge to a
Belgian law that levied different charges on imported goods
based on the nature of the exporting nation's tax system. 3
While the language of the report was unclear, the panel found
that the Belgian law was inconsistent with Article I of the
GATT. 214 At least one scholar has suggested that, with respect to Article I, the Belgian Report "can be interpreted to
support the proposition that while treatment can differ if the
characteristicsof goods themselves are different, differences in
treatment of imports cannot be based on differences in characteristics of the exporting country which do not result in differences in the goods themselves."215 ILSA's export and import
sanctions would be imposed based on the characteristics of the
exporting or importing countries since the conduct that triggered those sanctions would be a reflection of the trading policies of those countries. Like all GATT panel decisions, howev-

208. See JACKSON, supra note 69, at 133.
209. GATT, supra note 38, art. I(1). For a more detailed discussion of ILSA's
export and import sanctions see Part IV-...&2.
210. See generally Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172,
§§ 5(a)-(b), 6(2), (6), 110 Stat. 1541, 1543-46 (1996).
211. See id. § 5(a)-(b).

212. Belgian Family Allowances (Allocations Familiales), Nov. 7, 1952, GATT
B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 59 (1953) [hereinafter Belgian Report].
213. See i

para. 1. This proposition extends to the treatment of exports since

"exports" and "imports" are interchangeable in Article I. See GATI, supra note 38,
art. I(1).
214. See Belgian Report, supra note 212, paras. 3, 8.
215. See JACKSON, supra note 69, at 138.
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er, the Belgian Report is not binding precedent, and the United
States could downplay its significance because its language is
somewhat ambiguous.216 As such, Article I would not provide
as strong a basis for challenging ILSA as Article XI of the
GATT.217 Article I would, however, provide the complaining
party with an additional argument in case the Article XI argument should fail.
C. Even If ILSA Does Not Violate Any Specific Provisions of
the GATT, Does the Statute Nullify or Impair the Benefits
and Impede the Attainment of the Objectives of That Agreement?
In the unlikely event that a panel should find ILSA to be
consistent with Articles XI and I of the GATT, the complaining
party may choose to argue that the statute: (1) nullifies or
impairs its benefits under the GATT; and (2) impedes the attainment of the objectives of that agreement.21 s This argument finds its basis in Article XXII of the GATT, which allows
any Member to seek redress through the WTO dispute resolution mechanism if it "should consider any benefit accruing to it
directly or indirectly under [the GATTI is being nullified or
impaired or that the attainment of any objective of [the GATTI
is being impeded as the result of... the application.., of any
measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of [the
GATT]."219

The first claim can be described as non-violation nullification and impairment 0° From a historical perspective, nonviolation nullification and impairment claims have only been
addressed in a handful of disputes."' The majority of these
claims involved the nullification of expected benefits from tariff
concessions.2 2 Relying on these precedents, the complaining
216. See id. Prior panel reports are not binding within the meaning of stare
decisis. See id. at 89. They are, however, a commonly relied upon source of persuasive authority for purposes of subsequent panel decisions. See id. at 89-90.
217. See generally supra Part IV.
218. See GATT, supra note 38, art. XXIII.
219. Id.
220. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 357.
221. See id.
222. See id at 363; see also 2 ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 75, at 661. Tariff
concessions, which are generally governed by Article II of the GATT, are agreements by contracting parties to set maximum tariff rates for particular goods. See
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party could argue that sanctions under ILSA would nullify and
impair its expected benefits from any tariff concessions made
prior to the statute's enactment. This argument would be
based on the assertion that ILSA's effect on trade between the
United States and the complaining party could not have been
reasonably anticipated when the tariff concessions were being
negotiated. A similar argument was addressed in the panel
report on United States-Trade Measures Affecting
Nicaragua' (NicaraguaReport). The Nicaragua Report involved a non-violation nullification and impairment challenge
to an embargo that was imposed against Nicaragua by the
United States.' The embargo that gave rise to that case is
somewhat similar to ILSA in that it was motivated by national
security considerations on the part of the United States.2
While the panel ultimately reserved judgment on the non-violation nullification and impairment claim, its discussion suggested that the embargo frustrated Nicaragua's expected benefits from U.S. tariff concessions. 6 The United States may try
and distinguish ILSA from the NicaraguaReport embargo by
arguing that the latter involved trade barriers that were imposed against an entire nation while the former only provides
The
for sanctions against individual persons or entities."
validity of this distinction is undermined, however, by the
panel report on EEC-Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseed and Related Animal-Feed
Proteins.2" This panel decision can be interpreted as standJACKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 384-85; see also GATT, supra note 38, art. II.

The specific tariff concessions for each contracting party are embodied in a lengthy
group of schedules that are appended to the GATT. See JACKSON ET AL., supra
note 48, at 384.
223. United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, GATT Doc. IJ6053
(Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, GTTWTO file
[hereinafter Nicaragua Report].
224. See id. para. 4.8.
225. See id. para- 4.9.
226. The panel noted that the embargo had "seriously upset the competitive
relationship between the embargoed products and other directly competitive products." Id. para. 5.6. The panel went on to find, however, that it did not have the
authority to recommend an adequate remedy for restoring the competitive relationship that existed prior to when the tariff concessions were made. See id. para.
5.10. Ultimately, the panel proposed a series of questions in lieu of a resolution to
the dispute. See id. paras. 5.17-5.18.
227. See id. para. 4.8; see also Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-172, §§ 5(c), 14(14), 110 Stat. 1541, 1544, 1550 (1996).

228. EEC-Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oil-
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ing for the proposition that a non-violation nullification and
impairment claim falls on whether an adverse change in competitive conditions takes place rather than on whether that
change actually impacts imports." ILSA would clearly create
an adverse change in competitive conditions since the imposition of the statute's import and export sanctions could effectively prevent certain foreign persons from trading with the
United States."0 Therefore, a panel could justify a finding of
non-violation nullification and impairment in the context of
ILSA, even if there was no specific violation of GATT Articles
XI or I."3
Even fewer disputes have arisen involving the second
claim, that ILSA impedes the attainment of the objectives of
the GATT. 2 Where such claims have been made, they have
either not been pursued or not been addressed due to lack of
specificity as to exactly what objectives were being impeded. 3 It therefore follows that the first step in claiming that
the objectives of the GATT are being impeded would be to
ascertain specifically what those objectives are. Several of the
GATT's objectives are discussed in the Preamble to the agreement including "raising the standards of living, ensuring full
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real
income and effective demand, developing the full use of the
resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods."' The Preamble goes on to state that these
objectives are to be facilitated by "reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction

seed and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Jan. 25, 1990, GA'T B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.)
at 86 (1991).
229. See id. paras. 151-152.
230. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act §§ 6(2), (6).
231. It should be noted that the available remedies in non-violation nullification
and impairment cases are somewhat different from those cases where a specific
GATT provision has been violated. See DSU art. 26(1). The significant differences

are: (1) the losing party is not obligated to withdraw the measure that is the
subject of the complaint and the panel or appellate body may only recommend

that a "mutually satisfactory adjustment" be made; and (2) compensation may be
part of the "mutually satisfactory" adjustment in the final settlement. Id. art.
26(1)(b), (d). For a discussion of the remedies that would be available if ILSA
violated GATT Article XI or I see discussion infra Part V.
232. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 349.
233. See generally 2 ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 75, at 654-55.
234. GATT, supra note 38, preamble.
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of tariffs and other barriers to trade and the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.""'
The complaining party could argue that ILSA would have
a negative impact on any or all of these objectives since it
could prevent sanctioned persons from participating in various
forms of trade with the United States."6 The Nicaragua Report would provide some support for this claim, since the panel
in that case concluded that embargoes imposed for security
reasons run counter to several of the aims of the GATT. 7
Among the relevant objectives identified by the panel were the
fostering of non-discriminatory trade policies and the reduction
of uncertainty in trade relationsY As previously discussed,
however, ILSA's sanctions can be distinguished from the broad
embargo that was imposed in the Nicaragua ReportY 9 Since
ILSA's sanctions are only imposed against individual persons
or entities and not entire nations, it could be argued that the
relationship between the statute and the objectives in the
GATT Preamble is tenuous at best. ° For these reasons, it
would be difficult, though not impossible, to successfully argue
that ILSA impedes the attainment of the objectives of the
GATT.
D. Is ILSA's Procurement Sanction Consistent With the
Obligations of the United States Under the AGP?
ILSA's procurement sanction, located in Section 6(5) of the
statute, prohibits the United States government from procuring or entering into any contract for the procurement of any
goods or services from a sanctioned person." 1 In order to
challenge this sanction under the AGP, the complaining party
must first show that certain threshold requirements have been
satisfied. Since the AGP is a plurilateral trade agreement, all
Members of the WTO are not necessarily parties to the

235. Id.
236. See 142 CONG. REC. H6472 (daily ed. June 18, 1996) ("[uin short, [ILSA]
requires foreign companies to choose between investing in our market and those of
Iran and Libya") (statement of Rep. Gilman).
237. See Nicaragua Report, supra note 223, para. 5.16.
238. See id.
239. See supra text accompanying note 227.
240. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, §§ 5(c),
14(14), 110 Stat. 1541, 1544, 1550 (1996); see also GATT, supra note 38, preamble.
241. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 6(5).
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AGP. 2 Of the WTO Member countries, the only nations that
are parties to the AGP consist of Austria, Canada, the EU (on
behalf of its member states), Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
States.23 The complaining party would have to be one of
these party nations in order to challenge ILSA under the provisions of the AGP.2 4
Furthermore, the application of the AGP in challenging
ILSA's procurement sanction would be limited to procurements
that fall within the scope of the AGP. The AGP covers: (1) any
contract for the procurement of either goods or services; 5 (2)
by a governmental entity or sub-central governmental entity;24 (3) which is worth more than the required contract value threshold amount" 47 (4) subject to the specifications in
Appendix I of the AGP. 4 Appendix I lists all of the parties
to the AGP. 49 Under each party's listing in Appendix I, there
are five annexes and a section of general notes that define the
extent of each party's respective obligations. 5 Annex 1 contains covered central governmental entities, Annex 2 contains
covered sub-central governmental entities, Annex 3 contains
other covered entities, Annex 4 specifies covered services in
general, Annex 5 specifies covered construction services, and
the general notes set out specific exclusions and derogations
from the annexes that apply to specific signatories."5 In addition to listing the different governmental entities that are
subject to the AGP, the annexes contain the contract value
threshold amounts for each covered area. 2 The operation of

242. See DSU app. I(C). Members of the WTO do not have to become parties
to any of the plurilateral trade agreements. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at

303. Multilateral trade agreements, in contrast, are mandatory for all WTO Members. See id. at 302.
243. See Dennin & Boucher, supra note 42, at 2.
244. See AGP art. XXIV(1).
245. See id. art. 1(2).
246. See id. art. I(1) n.1.
247. See id. art. I(4).
248. See id. art. I(1).
249. See id. art. XXIV(1).
250. See Dennin & Boucher, supra note 42, at 3-4; see also AGP art. I(1) n.1.
251. See Dennin & Boucher, supra note 42, at 4; see also AGP art. I(1) n.1.
252. See AGP art. 1(1) n.1. The contract value threshold amounts are expressed
in terms of "special drawing rights" (SDR), the international reserve unit of account used by the IMF. See Dennin & Boucher, supra note 42, at 5 n.15.
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Appendix I illustrates the reciprocity-based approach that
underlies the AGP. Pursuant to Appendix I, the procurement areas for which the United States is obligated differ in
relation to each of the other parties to the AGP.' These differences are a direct reflection of the extent that the procurement markets of the respective parties have been opened up to
U.S. suppliersY 5 It is therefore unlikely that the application
of ILSA's procurement sanction will be within the scope of the
AGP unless procurements are prohibited in an area where the
complaining party has given reciprocal opportunities to U.S.
suppliers."6
Assuming the threshold requirements are satisfied, however, the imposition of ILSA's procurement sanction could potentially violate the AGP in at least two ways. Article VIII of the
AGP requires that, for purposes of qualifying government suppliers, parties shall limit "any conditions for participation in
tendering procedures.., to those which are essential to ensure
the firm's capability to fulfil the contract in question."" The
complaining party could argue that ILSA's procurement sanction prevents persons from becoming qualified suppliers based
on business activities that are conducted outside the jurisdiction of the United States and have no relationship whatsoever
to the capability of those persons to fulfill any government
procurement contractY

Even if there is no Article VIII violation, the complaining
party could claim that ILSA's procurement sanction impedes
the attainment of the objectives of the AGP. This argument
would be based on Article XH of the AGP which allows any
party to resort to the WTO's dispute resolution mechanism if:

253. See Dennin & Boucher, supra note 42, at 3-4.

254.
255.
256.
257.

See generally AGP app. 1 (United States).
See Dennin & Boucher, supra note 42, at 4.
Cf id. at 3-4.
AGP art. VIII(b).

258. Sanctions are triggered under ILSA based on the sanctioned person's en-

gagement in certain kinds of transactions with Iran or Libya. See Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 5(a)-(b), 110 Stat. 1541, 1543 (1996).
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[it] considers that any benefit accruing to it, directly or indirectly, under [the AGPI is being nullified or impaired, or that
the attainment of any objective of [the AGPI is being impeded... [due to] the application by another Party... of any
measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of
[the AGPI. 9
One of the objectives recognized in the preamble to the AGP is
"the need for an effective multilateral framework of rights and
obligations with respect to laws, regulations, procedures and
practices regarding government procurement with a view to
achieving greater liberalization and expansion of world trade
and improving the international framework for the conduct of
world trade."2" It could be argued that ILSA's procurement
sanction impedes the attainment of this objective since it denies certain foreign persons access to the United States government procurement market in order to advance policy interests
that are completely unrelated to the area of government procurement.2 6'
There is, however, an exception to ILSA's procurement
sanction in Section 5(f)(2) of the statute which is likely to prevent the threshold requirements of the AGP from being satisfied.2 62 This exception was created for the express purpose of
insuring that ILSA's procurement sanction is applied in a
manner consistent with the obligations of the United States
under the WTO and the AGP.2 Section 5(f)(2) of ILSA states
that, "in the case of procurement," the president is not required to impose sanctions on the "eligible products" of any
"designated" foreign country or instrumentality pursuant to
Sections 308(4) and 301(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act of
1979 (TAA).2" Section 308(4) of the TAA defines the term "eligible product" as any product or service that is covered by the
AGP.2 A nation may become a designated country or instru259. AGP art. XXII(2) (emphasis added).
260. Id. preamble.
261. The policy interest ILSA seeks to advance is the inhibition of Iran and
Libya's abilities to support acts of international terrorism and acquire methods of
mass destruction. See WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 9-10.
262. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 5(f)(2).
263. See generally WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 13-14.
264. Trade Agreements Act of 1979 §§ 301(b)(1), 308(4), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2511(b)(1),
2518(4) (1994); see also Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 5(f)(2).
265. See 19 U.S.C. § 2518(1), (4)(A)(i). In order for a product to be from a
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mentality under Section 301(b)(1) of the TAA if it is determined, by the U.S. Trade Representative, to be a party to the
AGP that will "provide appropriate reciprocal competitive procurement opportunities to [the] United States."2 6 Nearly all
of the party nations to the AGP have been so designated under
the TAA and would therefore be exempted from procurement
sanctions under Section 5(f)(2) of ILSA. 26" This exception
would prove to be important in cases where the sanctioned
person is from a nation that is a party to the AGP and the
nature of that sanctioned person's business is such that ILSA's
procurement sanction would be the only way for the statute to
have any practical impact. 2 1 Without the exception in Section 5(f)(2), the president might be forced to impose ILSA's
procurement sanction in situations like this since the imposition of meaningless sanctions would be contrary to ILSA's
legislative intent.269
The exception in Section 5(f)(2) of ILSA makes it unlikely
that ILSA's procurement sanction will be imposed against any
of the party nations to the AGP. As such, if ILSA's procurement sanction is imposed at all, the sanctioned party probably
will not have ratified the AGP and will have no standing to
invoke the provisions of that agreement.1 0 Since the party
nations to the AGP are comprised of most of the major U.S.
trading partners, however, it is hard to imagine a situation

particular "foreign country or instrumentality" under the Trade Agreements Act of
1979 (TAA): (1) it must be wholly the growth, product, or manufacture of that
country or instrumentality; or (2) if it consists partially of materials from another
county, it must have been transformed into a new and different article of commerce with a name, character, or use distinct from the articles from which is was
formed. See id. § 2518(4)(B)(i)-(ii).
266. Id. § 2511(b)(1)(A)-(B). The authority to make this determination is vested
in the president by the TAAL See id. § 2511(b). The president, in turn, delegated
this function to the United States Trade Representative in Exec. Order No. 12,260,
46 Fed. Reg. 1653 (1981). A list of the countries or instrumentalities that have
been designated under the TAA are contained in the Federal Acquisition Regulations. See Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. § 25.401 (1996).
267. Compare 48 C.F.R. § 25.401, with AGP app. I.
268. Such a case might occur, for example, if the sanctioned person is a foreign
corporation that has almost no dealings with the United States other than in the
form of government procurement contracts and is the national of a country that is
a party to the AGP.
269. See 142 CONG. REC. H6476 (daily ed. June 18, 1996) (the "imposition of
meaningless sanctions would be inconsistent" with the intent of Congress) (statement of Rep. Gilman).
270. See generally Dennin & Boucher, supra note 42, at 2.
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where the Section 5(f)(2) exception will not apply and the imposition of ILSA's procurement sanction will have any meaningful effect. 71 ' Since thl party nations to the AGP make up a
significant portion of the global procurement market, it is
these countries that are likely to have significant procurement
contracts with the United States and will be vulnerable to the
imposition of ILSA's procurement sanction. 2 Therefore, as a
practical matter, the effectiveness of ILSA's procurement sanction will ultimately be limited by Section 5(f)(2).
E.

Are Sanctions Under ILSA Justified by the Security
Exception in Article XXI of the GATT?

Article XXI of the GATT, entitled "Security Exceptions,"
provides that "[niothing in this Agreement shall be construed... to prevent any contracting party from taking any
action which it considers necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests... taken in time of war or other
emergency in international relations." 27 3 This exception is not
limited to any specific provision of the GATT and, if applicable,
could exempt ILSA from all of the requirements of that agree27 4
ment.
The materials that embody ILSA's legislative history contain numerous references to Iran and Libya's status as "rogue
regimes" that threaten the security interests of the United
States by supporting acts of international terrorism. 5 The
United States could argue that sanctions under the statute
would be justified by the GATT's security exception because

271. See Gary H. Sampliner & Brian J. O'Shea, Rules of Origin for Foreign
Acquisitions Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, NAFTA, and the New GATT
Accords, 23 PUB. CONT. L.J. 207, 239 (1993-1994); see also Dennin & Boucher,
supra note 42, at 2-3.
272. See Dennin & Boucher, supra note 42, at 2-3.
273. GATT, supra note 38, art. XXI. There is a similar security exception in
Article XXIII of the AGP. See AGP art. XXIH(1). The language of the AGP security exception has been modified somewhat to encompass the area of government
procurement. Compare GATT, supra note 38, art. XXI, with AGP art. XXIII(1).
Since the ILSA will, in all likelihood, not be imposed in violation of the AGP this

Note does not address the distinctions between the two exceptions. See Part IV.D.
274. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 983.
275. See, e.g., INVL RELATIONS REPORT, supra note 83, at 8 ("[fit is the view of
the committee that enactment of ...
[ILSA] will be a key element in United
States policy of cutting off sources of funding to rogue regimes such as Iran and

Libya") (emphasis added).
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the conduct of Iran and Libya has created an "emergency in
international relations" within the meaning of Article XXI."
The complaining party could respond by arguing that, irrespective of Iran and Libya's alleged status as "rogue regimes,"
ILSA does not involve any "essential security interest" for
purposes of Article XXI because sanctions under the statute
would not have any meaningful impact on those nations.277
Given the ambiguous language of Article XXI, either of these
interpretations could apply. 8
The plain language of Article XXI, which refers to actions
taken by a contracting party that "it considers necessary,"
suggests that the party relying on the exception has unfettered
discretion as to when it may be invoked.279 This interpretation can be supported by the reported disputes involving Article XXI, where there have been signs of extreme deference to
the judgment of the party invoking the exception."0 Two cases in particular illustrate this approach. The first case occurred
at the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Contracting Parties
(Twenty-Second Meeting) where Czechoslovakia complained
that certain export controls operated by the United States were
contrary to several Articles of the GATT."o1 During the course
of this discussion one contracting party stated that, in the
context of Article XXI, "the United States action would seem to
be justified because every country must have the last resort on
questions relating to its own security." 2 The complaint was
ultimately rejected by a roll call vote of seventeen to one with

276. See GATT, supra note 38, art. MXI(b)(iii); see also generally INT'L RELATIONS REPORT, supra note 83, at 8-10.
277. The potential ineffectiveness of ILSA's sanctions was a major point of
debate prior to the statute's enactment. This is reflected in the following quote
from the Congressional debates over ILSA:

Iran has 65 million people and a $300 billion economy. Libya has 5 million people and a $33 billion economy. Neither country can be isolated,
geographically or economically. In both countries, exports are growing.

From 1988 to 1994, Iran's exports grew nearly 50 percent, to $19 billion.
Libya's exports grew nearly 10 percent to 8 billion.
142 CONG. REc. H8127 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Rep. Roth).
278. See JACKSON, supra note 69, at 204.
279. GATT, supra note 38, art. XXII(b).
280. See JACKSON, supra note 69, at 204-05.

281. Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting Contracting Parties, GATT
Doc. CP.3/SR22 (June 8, 1949), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, GTWTO file
[hereinafter Twenty-Second Meeting].
282. Id. at 7 (statement of representative from the United Kingdom).
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three abstentions.' The second case was the Nicaragua Report, where the United States explicitly invoked the security
exception to justify the imposition of an embargo against Nicaragua.' In that case, the terms of reference' were fixed
so as to prohibit the panel from examining the invocation of
Article XXI by the United States.' At first glance these cases suggest that, as the party invoking the exception, the position of the United States should prevail.
A closer examination of prior GATT practice with respect
to Article XXI, however, suggests that a panel could come to a
radically different conclusion. Regardless of what was done in
the reported cases, the contracting parties have been reluctant
to formally invoke Article XXI throughout the history of the
GATT. 7 Certain scholars have interpreted this reluctance as
reflecting the view that Article XXI should be used sparingly
due to its significant potential for abuse.2" Even in the reported cases, there is some evidence that complete deference to
the party invoking the exception is not always warranted.
During the Twenty-Second Meeting, the same contracting
party that advocated for deference with respect to Article XXI
security determinations went on to note that "the CONTRACTING PARTIES should be cautious not to take any step which
might have the effect of undermining the General Agreement."289 Moreover, the preparatory work to Article XXI suggests that the phrase "essential security interests" was inserted with the intention of preventing an overbroad interpretation
of the security exception." In 1982, the contracting parties
adopted the Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General
Agreement29' (Article XX Decision), which stated that

283.
284.
285.
review.

See id. at 10.
See Nicaragua Report, supra note 223, para. 4.4.
A panel's terms of reference are instructions that define the issues it may
See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 342. Under the WTO dispute reso-

lution mechanism, panels automatically have broad terms of reference set unless

the parties to the dispute agree otherwise. See DSU art. 7(1).
286. See Nicaragua Report, supra note 223, paras. 5.2-5.3.
287. See JACKSON, supra note 69, at 204-05.
288. See id. at 204
289. Twenty-Second Meeting, supra note 281, at 7 (statement of representative
from the United Kingdom).
290. See 1 ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 75, at 600.
291. Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, Nov. 30, 1982,
GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 23 (1983) [hereinafter Article XXI Decision].
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"[w]hen action is taken under Article XXI, all contracting parties affected by such action retain their full rights under the
General Agreement."292 The language in the Article XX Decision seems broad enough to support the assertion that the
"rights" discussed therein include the right of a WTO Member
to have a panel rule on matters of nullification and impairment pursuant to GATT Article XXIII and the DSU.293 It
could be argued that a panel would have the authority to review an Article XXI invocation because permitting the security
exception to apply where there are no truly "essential security
interests" at stake would nullify and impair the benefits of the
complaining party. Based on this analysis, a panel would be
justified in making an independent determination as to whether ILSA involves "essential security interests" within the
meaning of Article XXI.
Due to the lack of any clear precedent, it is uncertain how
a panel would evaluate this issue. If the panel chooses to examine the validity of the security interests that ILSA purports
to protect, it would be placed in the awkward position of passing judgment on the security interests of a sovereign nation. In
the past, the United States expressed extreme discomfort when
faced with the possibility of dispute settlement panels making
such determinations.2 Recently, there were strong indications that the United States planned on invoking the security
exception in response to the EU challenge to the Helms-Burton
Act. 295 The United States took the position that it would not

recognize the panel's jurisdiction over the dispute once Article
XXI had been formally invoked.Y While the Helms-Burton
complaint was tentatively suspended in April of 1997,297 this
situation illustrates the serious political repercussions that
would accompany a panel inquiry into to the validity of an
Article XXI invocation by the United States. Assuming the
United States continues to insist that panels are precluded
from examining decisions to rely on Article XXI, the panel

292. Id. para. 2.
293. See generally GATT, supra note 38, art. XXHI; DSU art. 6.
294. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 986.
295. See David E. Sanger, U.S. Won't Offer Trade Testimony on Cuba Embargo,
N.Y. TINMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at Al.
296. See id.
297. See United States-The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, supra note 40, at 1; see also Apple, supra note 40.
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presiding over a challenge to ILSA will be placed in an extremely precarious position. Irrespective of how that panel
rules, its decision is likely to cause irreparable harm to the
institutional framework of the WTO. If the panel chooses to
reject the U.S. interpretation of Article XXI and exercises jurisdiction over a dispute involving ILSA, it could conceivably
escalate matters to the point where Congress reconsiders the
continued U.S. participation in the WTO 9 If the panel opts
for blind deference to Article XXI, however, the resulting precedent could open the door for future abuses of the security exception. 9 Such abuse could seriously undermine the effectiveness of the WTO dispute resolution mechanism in the long
term. These dangers lead to two conclusions regarding the use
of the security exception to justify ILSA. First, the United
States should weigh its options carefully before invoking Article XXI in the context of ILSA. Second, the best course of action would be to voluntarily refrain from using the security
exception, even if it would mean accepting an adverse ruling
on ILSA by the WTO.
V.

REPERCUSSIONS OF AN ADVERSE DECISION ON ILSA IN THE
WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM

A challenge to ILSA in the WTO would be likely to result
in the adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report which
-would conclude that the statute violates several articles of the
GATT." ° Such a report would recommend that the United
States withdraw the offending sanctions under ILSA in order
to come into conformity with the GATT.3"' In the event that
the report is not implemented within a "reasonable period of
time,""'2 the WTO could authorize the complaining party to
suspend its concessions to the United States under the relevant agreements as a result.0 ' While the suspension of con298. The implementing legislation for the agreements that were concluded in
the Uruguay Round provides that a joint resolution by the two Houses of Congress
can effect the withdrawal of the United States from the WTO. See Uruguay Round
Agreements Act § 125(b)-(c), 19 U.S.C. § 3535(b)-(c) (1994).
299. See JACKSON, supra note 69, at 204.
300. See discussion supra Part IV.
301. See DSU art. 19; see also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 343.
302. Generally, a "reasonable period of time" as defined by the DSU is not to
exceed 15 months. See DSU art. 21(3).
303. See id. art. 22(2).
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cessions has not been authorized since the 1950s, °4 it has
been suggested that the Uruguay Round changes will result in
more frequent use of such retaliatory measures."' As an alternative to suspension of concessions, voluntary compensation
to the complaining party could be allowed.05
Since ILSA was passed pursuant to an overwhelming
majority of votes in Congress, it is unlikely that the statute
will be repealed in order to comply with an adverse decision by
the WTO." 7 It is equally unlikely that compensation would
be awarded, since Congressional approval would be required
for such an expenditure. As an alternative to Congressional
action, the president could waive sanctions pursuant to Section
9(c) of ILSA to the extent necessary for the United States to
live up to its obligations under the GATT.08 Providing the
GATT's security exception has not been invoked, there is nothing to suggest that the president would refrain from using this
waiver authority to comply with an adverse panel decision.0 9
The problem with relying on Section 9(c), however, is that it
only provides a short term solution. As long as ILSA remains
in force, the president will have a supposedly "mandatory"
obligation to impose sanctions on foreign nationals who engage
in impermissible trade with Iran or Libya."'0 Moreover, Section 9(c) of ILSA can only be invoked after the president makes
a detailed report to Congress explaining the reasons for the
waiver."' While ILSA does not grant Congress the authority
to veto decisions to grant waivers, the president may be subjected to political pressures that limit his use of Section

304. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 344.
305. See 1d. at 369.
306. See DSU art. 22(1)-(2).
307. ILSA was passed by the House of Representatives with 415 favorable
votes and 19 abstentions. See 142 CONG. REC. H6528 (daily ed. June 19, 1996).
308. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
110 Stat. 1541, 1547 (1996).
309. To the contrary, Congress specifically contemplated that
to exercise the national interest waiver in Section 9(c) where "a
would raise significant issues under the international obligations

104-172, § 9(c)(1),
it might be proper
particular sanction
of the U.S." WAYS

& MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 18.
310. ILSA requires that the president "shall" impose sanctions against any
foreign "person" that engages in the transactions that are prohibited by the statute. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 5(a), (b). The imposition of sanctions is therefore mandatory under ILSA, subject to certain specific exceptions. See id. §§ 4(c),
5('), 9(c)(1).
311. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 9(c)(1)-(2).
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9(c). 3 ' Therefore, the United States will have difficulty com-

plying with repeated adverse panel decisions on ILSA and
retaliatory measures such as suspension of concessions will
eventually result.
VI. CONCLUSION
As of yet, sanctions under ILSA have not been imposed.
This has not been due to a lack of sanctionable conduct within
the international community. Potential violations of ILSA have
either been completely ignored or dismissed as violating the
spirit but not the letter of the statute.3 ' The lack of enforcement with respect to ILSA can be attributed, at least in
part, to the violations of the GATT and other related agreements that would arise if sanctions were imposed. It is relatively clear that ILSA's import and export sanctions are inconsistent with the obligations of the United States under the
GATT. 14 While ILSA's procurement sanction would not fall
within the scope of the GATT, the practical impact of that
sanction has been compromised significantly in an effort to
avoid similar violations of the AGP.315 Despite these considerations, the president will have to face the continuing possibility of imposing "mandatory" sanctions under the statute.3 1 6 If

sanctions are finally imposed, the United States will be forced
to defend the statute in the WTO. In the likely event that a
panel renders an adverse decision on ILSA, the president will
have to resort to the "national interest" waiver provision in
Section 9(c) of the statute or be faced with the authorization of
retaliatory measures by the WTO. 17
By the time this process is complete, ILSA's already fragile
credibility will be completely shattered. The president could, of
course, continue to avoid enforcing ILSA, but the ultimate
outcome would be the same. Foreign investors will eventually
view the statute as an empty threat and their conduct with

312. Cf WAYS & MEANS REPORT, supra note 10, at 18 (reiterating that the
president must provide a "detailed rationale to the Congress" if he chooses to
exercise waiver authority) (emphasis added).
313. See discussion supra Part I.
314. See discussion supra Part IV.A.-C.
315. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
316. See discussion supra Part I.
317. See discussion supra Part V.
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respect to Iran and Libya will remain unchanged. If ILSA is to
have any credibility at all, the United States will have to en'force the statute more rigorously, relying on the security exception to avoid any challenge in the WTO. This can only be done
at the risk of seriously damaging the WTO's dispute resolution
mechanism. 18 In conclusion, ILSA is likely to raise a number
of troublesome foreign policy issues for the United States over
the next few years without seriously impacting the "rogue"
activities of Iran or Libya. In the year 2001, the statute's sunset provision will take effect and, mercifully, the matter will
end there. 19
Michael A. Asaro

318. See discussion supra Part IV.E.
319. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 13(b),
110 Stat. 1541, 1548 (1996).

